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Standard

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by Matthew Continetti



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Major foreign policy differences, especially regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have contributed to the deterioration of relationships between the United States and our traditional allies in Western Europe. There can be no doubt that some European leaders stonewalled the Bush administration on Iraq in order to provide lateral support to the Kerry campaign. With the Bush victory, however, Europe may choose the wiser path of mending fences with Washington.

Yet an anti-American spirit has been unleashed in the European street, and it will be difficult to tame, not only because of foreign policy but also because of economics. Poor economic performance in Europe feeds a politics of resentment, and the scapegoat has been the United States.

In 2000, the European Union (EU) launched the ambitious Lisbon process, a reform agenda enabling the EU to become “the most competitive and dynamic, knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, creating more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” by the year 2010. Lisbon was also a declaration of competition with the United States for global economic primacy. A high-level commission headed by former Dutch prime minister Wim Koks recently determined, however, that European economic performance was deeply disappointing. The gap with the United States has been growing larger, and the Lisbon goals are further away than ever.

Third-quarter growth in the United States was reported at 3.7 percent, a figure eliciting disappointment because it was lower than some

had expected. Compare this, however, with the euro economies, where growth in 2004 may only reach 1.8 percent and is predicted to climb at most to a breathtaking 1.9 percent in 2005. Why is growth so slow? The Koks report blames politicians for failing to carry out necessary reforms.

The inability to reform—in the labor market, in impediments to trade, and in the social welfare network—is precisely where the problem of anti-Americanism enters. Efforts to deregulate and liberalize the economy are easily tagged with negative labels: French pundits denounce them as “Anglo-Saxon”; German politicians shun them as the feared “American conditions.” **Although Europe urgently needs structural reform, it hides behind the smoke screen of anti-Americanism,** which is really anticapitalism. Rejecting America because of capitalism, however, means repressing the European tradition of free market thinkers from Adam Smith to Friedrich von Hayek.

Many Europeans believe that their slow economy is the price they must pay for their elaborate welfare state. This, however, turns out to be an illusion. A recent study by the Austrian Labor Council shows that the portion of GDP devoted to the social safety net is greater in the United States than it is in Europe; although European states generously pay out more in welfare benefits, they take much more back through higher tax rates.

At the end of the day, anti-Americanism as a block to economic reform inhibits European prosperity. The more Europeans demonstrate, the farther they fall behind. Good-bye to Lisbon.

—Russell A. Berman

*Russell A. Berman is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Walter A. Haas Professor in the Humanities at Stanford University. He is the author of *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem* (2004).*

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Bush Greeted by Cheering Canadians

No, really. Not everybody up in Molson Land is like that crazy, jackbooted lady MP we told you about last week. Okay, sure, some of them are—like the estimated 5,000 Canadians (plus Bob Dylan) who turned out in below-freezing weather to jeer President Bush during his state visit to Ottawa last week. “There are people here representing a wide range of opinions,” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation correspondent Paddy Moore observed of the protesters, without apparent irony: “from anti-globalization, ‘no to Star Wars,’ support for Palestine, Marxism, not [to] mention exclamations like ‘Queers hate Bush.’” Before the day was through, the aforementioned “wide range of opinions” was energetically exercised—amid what another news account called “copious amounts of marijuana smoke”—by means of paint-filled balloons, sharp sticks, and hurled rocks. At least two Canadian police officers were sent to the hospital, one with

“serious facial injuries.” THE SCRAPBOOK prays for their full and speedy recovery.

And we are no doubt joined in this sentiment by a group of “Canadian pro-Bush activists” organized by Connie Wilkins and Mark Fournier, founders of *FreeDominion.ca*. (Which is sort of like the *FreeRepublic.com* of Canada, apparently.) “About 200 of us showed up to rally for Bush” at Ottawa’s airport, stalwart Maple Leaf Pete Vere writes. And when the president caught sight of them as he drove by, “the biggest Texas grin you ever saw came over his face,” and he “gave us the big thumbs up.” Mr. Vere says he “cannot describe the euphoria we felt at that point. . . . Some young mother pointed the president out to her toddler and said ‘That’s what a real leader looks like, honey.’”

Incredible, eh?

THE SCRAPBOOK tips its hat, as well, to a 48-year-old engineer from Oshawa, Ontario, who marched through the

downtown crowd of paint-bombers carrying a sign reading “Support President Bush.” As the *Ottawa Sun* quite correctly points out, “John Al-Hassani is Canadian, too.” But “I came to this country from Iraq,” Mr. Al-Hassani tells the *Sun*. “I have family there. I talk to them all the time.” So he consequently has little patience for those of his fellow Canadians who think it proper to jeer the president of the United States as a “murderer.”

“Look at these fools,” says Al-Hassani. “They have no idea. They are idiots. They are simple babies. The majority of Iraqis are glad Bush liberated them from Saddam Hussein. But you don’t see that on TV, only the terrorist gangsters blowing people up. . . . These people have never suffered. They make me sick. . . . If Canada was a terrible dictatorship like Iraq was under Saddam, would these people tell Bush ‘No, no, don’t invade, we don’t want you to give us freedom?’” ♦

Dumb . . .

A divided three-judge panel of the Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals last week enjoined enforcement of a 1996 congressional enactment known as the Solomon Amendment—which makes colleges and universities ineligible for federal funding if they refuse to cooperate with Defense Department recruiters. The plaintiffs in the case are a coalition of 25 leading law schools and some 900 individual law professors who complain that the Solomon Amendment, by pressuring them to cooperate in a violation of their own antidiscrimination policies and principles, violates their rights to free speech and association.

Practically speaking: The law school professors and administrators believe that the Solomon Amendment uncon-

stitutionally abridges their prerogative to prohibit representatives of the Pentagon’s Judge Advocate General’s office—which restricts employment opportunities for openly homosexual attorneys—from conducting job interviews on campus. Or, as lead plaintiffs’ attorney Joshua Rosenkranz crowed to reporters after the Third Circuit had announced it agreed with him: “In a free society, the government cannot co-opt private institutions as government mouthpieces.”

Sophisticated readers will here recognize what is generally referred to as a “compelled speech” First Amendment argument. Sophisticated readers will also think it uncommonly stupid, for reasons that the following rough but eminently fair paraphrase of Mr. Rosenkranz’s legal logic should make clear:

We, America’s most famous and

respected legal educators, have a First Amendment interest in promoting our views about gay rights by preventing our students from hearing job pitches from Defense Department attorneys. The Solomon Amendment, which we have heretofore carefully obeyed, requires us thereby to announce, in effect, that—all things being equal—our views about gay rights are really just a self-righteous pose, and we’d much rather have our federal money, gimme, gimme, gimme. It is embarrassing to be exposed as hypocrites like this. Embarrassing the nation’s law schools is unconstitutional.

As we say, it’s an uncommonly stupid argument. The case is very likely now headed to the Supreme Court. Whose justices will very likely give the Third Circuit—and the nation’s law schools—the right good spanking they deserve. ♦



And Dumber

Tuan Thai has been convicted of a string of violent crimes since entering this country from Vietnam in 1996. Here's Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals describing the circumstances of Thai's third-degree assault conviction: "He became angry at his girlfriend because she was singing about their relationship. He threatened to kill her. He knocked her down and punched her 10 to 20 times. He pushed a chair down on her and choked her with both hands, then bound her up with a cable around her wrists and ankles. He also stuffed a microphone into her mouth and turned up the radio."

Here's Judge Kozinski on Mr. Thai's third-degree rape conviction: "While his friend was out fishing in Alaska, he raped his friend's girlfriend repeatedly over the course of several months, beginning while she was six months pregnant. He . . . threatened to put cocaine in her vagina and harm her other children if she tried to kick him out, and threatened to kill her more times than she could remember." As Judge Kozinski also points out, Thai's cellmate at a "federal psychiatric facility reported that he had threatened to kill his INS judge and prosecutor after he was released."

Unfortunately, Judge Kozinski's terrifying description of this Tuan Thai fellow comes to us in the form of a stinging

dissent from his Ninth Circuit colleagues' November 24 refusal to reconsider their earlier order that the federal government "return Thai to the Western District of Washington for his release" onto the streets of Seattle. A majority of Ninth Circuit judges apparently believe that Supreme Court precedents require them to free this maniac. This, too, is an uncommonly stupid judgment likely to be reversed.

But that probably won't make you feel any better if you live in Seattle. ♦

Liberal Mullahs Mugged by Reality

According to Iranian politicians and analysts," the *Washington Post's* Robin Wright reports, Tehran's government is abandoning reform amid signs of a "takeover by conservatives determined to restore the revolution's Islamic purity." As a result, "fear, intimidation and harassment have become instruments of the state in ways reminiscent of the early fervor following the 1979 revolution."

And, if the *Post* dispatch is any indication, the nomenclature *nomenklatura* has decided to call the currently dominant faction of mullahs in Tehran . . . yup, "neoconservatives." Iran's "neoconservatives," Wright explains, "have the largest presence in the new parliament, the judiciary, and the powerful Guardian Council, a body of 12 unelected clerics that can veto new laws and political candidates." Their "platform mixes religious ideology with aspects of modernity"—just like here in the States!—and emphasizes "Islamic thought, competent government and the private sector."

Opposing the neoconservatives, incidentally, are a group of "ideological conservatives" with more "puritanical" views, says the *Post*. These people are "sometimes called Kayhanis." Must be how you spell "paleocons" in Farsi. ♦

Casual

LITERALLY EXASPERATED

At some point in the near future I will become a bratwurst. I owe this startling realization to Naomi Judd. The singer-actress-philosopher sat down with Larry King recently to promote *Naomi's Breakthrough Guide: 20 Choices to Transform Your Life*. Not content to mimic the mawkish language of the self-help set, she promised to take the conversation to the "neuroscientist level." Then she declared: "We literally become whatever we think about all day."

Literally?

Judd also speaks of "literally looking in the Mirror of Truth," and has told a national television audience, "I literally take you by the hand in this book."


I'm not sure how that works. But it is not nearly as evocative as the question actress Jamie Lee Curtis posed recently in an appearance on Canadian television. Curtis, fresh from the success of her own book, *I'm Gonna Like Me: Letting Off a Little Self-Esteem*, was making the rounds to promote her follow-up work, *It's Hard to Be Five: Learning How to Work My Control Panel*.

"How many college students," she wanted to know, "do we hear in their freshman year literally explode? They explode with drugs and alcohol, they explode with sex, they explode with eating, they explode with not being able to get work done on time. . . . These people are exploding."

The misuse of the word "literally" is a problem not limited to female entertainers. It has been the subject of debate for decades. The literal meaning of a word or phrase, according to *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, is one that adheres to "fact or to the ordinary construction or primary meaning of a term or expression" and is

"free from exaggeration or embellishment." But the word has been misused for so long that most lexicographers have simply given up. Many dictionaries now recognize "literally" as a generic intensifier—thus justifying the use of "literally" when its opposite, "figuratively," is intended.

It is easy to see why the authorities are throwing in the towel. During lunch with an old friend, he told me about a comedian who was "literally side-splitting."



And then a concert that "literally knocked my socks off." He was "literally on the fence" about gay marriage and had spent so much time at work he had "literally become one with my computer." By the end of the meal I literally had to hold my tongue to keep from saying anything. I got several strange looks.

Even people who talk for a living are apt to make this error. But I will not capitulate. I will continue to take *literally* literally. So when CNN's Jack Cafferty says he's "literally on pins and needles," I understand that to be an explanation for his sour (but strangely likable) early-morning demeanor.

In my literal world, Fox News Channel's Rita Cosby inadvertently provided the most compelling reason I've heard to ban cameras from the courtroom. Ticking off a litany of setbacks for Scott Peterson in his never-

ending trial, she came to "possibly the biggest blow of all," in which "court observers saw a key defense witness literally melt down on the stand." Over the summer, NBC's Katie Couric reported from the sweltering heat of the Athens Olympics that "it's so hot, my brain is literally fried." This admission may explain her subsequent campaign coverage.

The confusion continued even on Election Day. CNN's Ed Henry described South Dakota Democrats "literally at this hour combing through voting rolls in precincts." Few people know this, but South Dakota keeps its voter lists on hair.

When Dennis Hastert implied that Osama bin Laden might favor the Democratic ticket, John Edwards attacked his musical inclinations. "Literally, in the last 24 hours Denny Hastert, the speaker of the House, has joined the fear-mongering choir."

But bin Laden wasn't nearly as scary if you believed the analysis of Canadian TV's Beverly Thompson. When the al Qaeda leader popped up two days before the election, Thompson wondered if this meant he was "literally a jack-in-the-

box."

As the presidential race tightened, Fox News Channel's John Gibson said the candidates were "literally neck and neck." Perhaps because of this proximity, MSNBC's Chris Matthews, possibly drawing on his years as a cop in Philadelphia, wanted Kerry to get physical with Bush in the debates. "I think if Kerry can make the stakes really heavy and focus on Iraq . . . he can probably wipe the smile off the president's face, literally. And that may hurt the president."

Matthews also saw something I missed in the second debate. He "thought it was interesting," he said, "when [moderator] Charles Gibson was literally steam-rolled by the president."

That must have hurt Charles Gibson. Literally.

STEPHEN F. HAYES



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Correspondence

GUNS AND BUTTER

TOM DONNELLY AND VANCE SERCHUK rightly argue that the United States needs to strengthen its military ("A Bigger, Badder, Better Army," Nov. 29), but they make a huge error by deriding Republicans who "would rather emphasize a domestic agenda," such as entitlement reform. Instead of seeing it as an obstacle, they should consider entitlement reform a necessary step toward building the military they envision.

The reason why the United States cannot allocate as big a share of its budget to defense now as it did during the Cold War is that mandatory spending (mainly on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) currently gobbles up more than half of the budget. This will only get worse as a result of the rising costs of health care, longer life spans, and the retirement of baby boomers.

If the American government does not curb the growth of entitlements, within decades the nation will start to resemble European welfare states that are so burdened by social spending that they cannot adequately fund their defense forces.

PHILIP KLEIN
New York, NY

THE SICK MEN OF EUROPE

I WANT TO THANK Gerard Baker very much for his scintillating article on the decay of European society ("Bush's European Itinerary," Nov. 29) and his suggestions for President Bush's itinerary on his upcoming trip to Western Europe. Baker's perspectives on U.S.-European relations are an invaluable contribution to THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

STEVEN ROTHBERG
Bellevue, WA

CAMPUS "DIVERSITY"

AS THE SCRAPBOOK (Nov. 29) points out, the study by Santa Clara University professor Daniel Klein finding that Democrats outnumber Republicans at least seven to one among faculty members nationwide in the humanities and social sciences comes as

no surprise. Various sources I've seen indicate that the faculties at most major American universities are at least 85 percent liberal, anti-Bush, and pro-Democrat.

Ironically, these same universities talk about their "diversity" programs as if diversity were a campus religion. But apparently one must look in their special academic handbooks to understand their definition of the word.

In academia, "diversity" does not imply a meaningful political dialogue which allows for conservative students or faculty to have an equal voice on campus. Instead, it means tyranny of the liberal majority.

JIM O'BRIEN
Maitland, FL



USEFUL IDIOTS

THE SOLEMN IDIOCIES of David Remnick in praise of Yasser Arafat that THE SCRAPBOOK quotes (Nov. 29) are a reminder that Arafat's most spectacular achievement was to win the support of liberals everywhere for his manifold acts of terror.

Yes, he pioneered airline hijacking. Yes, he murdered Israeli schoolchildren and brainwashed Arab schoolchildren to become suicide bombers. Yes, he slaughtered Olympic athletes. Yes, he machine-gunned passengers in airline terminals.

But his greatest triumph was that he understood and exploited Western liberals' unwillingness to recognize the exis-

tence of evil: that is, their compulsion to view terror as reasonable, explainable, and even (in some cases) admirable. It was Arafat who taught the liberals at the *New Yorker* and the *New York Times* and NPR to think that the more barbaric the act of Palestinian terror, the greater the guilt of its victims, the Israelis.

Our "learned classes," ever in hot pursuit of root causes, have applied this same logic to the terrorist massacres of 9/11.

EDWARD ALEXANDER
Seattle, WA

THE MASTER TERRORIST

MARIO LOYOLA offers a refreshingly true assessment of the pathetic Yasser Arafat ("Arafat's True Legacy," Nov. 22). Arafat squandered opportunity after opportunity to leave behind a legacy as a statesman and peacemaker. Instead, he chose a path of terrorism and mired the Palestinian people in poverty, violence, despair, and hopelessness.

JED SOIFER
Mays Landing, NJ

AFTER ARAFAT

ROBERT SATLOFF's prescription for post-Arafat U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestinians ("A Democratic Palestine," Nov. 22) unfortunately fails to account for the most crucial aspect of the problem: the culture of anti-Jewish hatred that the Palestinian Authority regime continues to promote in its official media, schools, summer camps, speeches by PA officials, and sermons by PA-employed religious clergy.

Just look at the photograph, on page 29 of THE WEEKLY STANDARD's Nov. 22 issue, of a Palestinian child brandishing an automatic weapon. They are raising their children to hate and kill.

If there is to be any hope for a meaningful and durable peace, the PA regime and its culture of hate must be completely dismantled, in a manner comparable to the de-Nazification process that the Allies imposed upon Germany after World War II.

MORTON A. KLEIN
Zionist Organization of America
New York, NY

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Correspondence

DON'T FORGET MORMONS

IN PAUL MARSHALL'S excellent "Fundamentalists & Other Fun People" (Nov. 22), he outlines several religions and religious movements that do not have exhortations to jihad. But he failed to mention the movement founded by Joseph Smith: the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons).

The Mormons follow a religious principle outlined in the 11th article of Faith written by Smith. It states: "We claim the privilege of worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of our own conscience, and allow all men the same privilege, let them worship how, where, or what they may."

AL ISSA
Apex, NC

GEORGE W. TRUMAN?

THERE MAY BE SOME parallels between presidents Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush, as David Gelernter argues ("Truman Beats Dewey! Again!!" Nov. 15). But there are even more striking differences. President Truman did not try to destroy the New Deal programs that helped to lift so many out of poverty; he didn't tamper with Social Security for our elderly; and he made sure that returning veterans continued to enjoy the GI Bill, with education, housing, and other benefits which helped that great generation achieve its true potential. President Truman was also the uniter who integrated our military. He understood fiscal integrity and didn't cut taxes during wartime. The list goes on and on.

Say what you will about the results of this election, but I remember Harry Truman, I knew the work of Harry Truman, and believe me, George W. Bush is no Harry Truman!

JOAN D. LEVIN
Chicago, IL

BUT SIRIUSLY FOLKS . . .

AS A CHARTER SUBSCRIBER to Sirius Satellite Radio, I was more than a bit dismayed to read Victorino Matus's full-page advertisement for XM Satellite Radio ("Satellite Saved the Radio Star,"

Nov. 15). A fair and balanced presentation would have included a mention of Sirius, XM's only competitor.

I think that WEEKLY STANDARD subscribers should know Sirius Satellite Radio offers everything XM has and more, including those NFL and college football games so beloved in the "red" states.

DAVID D. BEGLEY
Omaha, NE

VICTORINO MATUS'S glowing and enthusiastic description of XM radio is entirely at variance with my experience. My XM came with a new car. I prefer "classical" music but there are only three channels dubbed "classical" on XM, one of which is "Pops" and another of which is strictly vocal ("Vox"). XM features 24-hour traffic and weather on one channel, but the voice on the traffic report sounds like a robot. I usually cannot understand the report, and when I can it frequently is wrong about the route I am traveling. I often get a "No Signal" reading, which is not helpful if you are listening to something of importance.

I looked into buying a home receiver, but was told by one of XM's technical support people that it probably would not work unless put in a room with windows looking out in the right compass direction. XM boasts of the quality of its sound; my CD player is better. XM boasts that it is commercial free; yet they play commercials.

For ten dollars a month, XM ain't worth it! If I continue with my service it will be solely because I can get Fox News Radio.

BILL OWENS
Boston, MA

BUTTIGLIONE BROUHAHA

I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH Christopher Caldwell's "Sins of Commission" (Nov. 15). It could have been a great introduction to the successful smear campaign against Rocco Buttiglione, originally chosen to be the European Union's justice commissioner. But it fell far short of this.

First, I thought Caldwell treaded too lightly on the issue of Europe's growing anti-Catholicism. Stronger words—and additional information—should have

been used to talk about the crude opposition to Buttiglione and the growing intolerance of European bureaucrats and interest groups toward religion in general (and Catholicism in particular).

Second, and perhaps more worrisome, Caldwell's piece contained one glaring factual error that could have (should have) been easily caught. Buttiglione did not found the Catholic lay movement "Comunione e Liberazione" in 1968. Rather, it has its roots in another movement started in Italy in 1954 by Luigi Giussani, a Catholic priest known around the world. The name Comunione e Liberazione began to be used in 1969.

ALVINO-MARIO FANTINI
Brattleboro, VT

A KINDRED GOP SPIRIT

I CAN'T THANK THE WEEKLY STANDARD enough for running Dan Gelernter's article ("An Army of One," Oct. 25) about being the only Republican student in his Connecticut high school.

My son is a ninth-grader in Groton, Massachusetts, a liberal stronghold, and you can only imagine the taunting and name-calling he had to endure after Senator John Kerry gave his concession speech. My son is the only person who raised his hand in history class in answer to the question: "Who supports the president?"

Nothing's going to change here in the land of the Kennedys, but at least it's comforting to know that my son is not alone. Kudos to Dan the Republican, and many thanks for the article. It cheered us.

JULIA HANS
Townsend, MA

. . .

THE WEEKLY STANDARD

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The Iraq Promise

The sounds one hears emanating from the Arab Middle East are the sounds, faint but unmistakable, of the ice cracking. Though long suppressed and successfully repressed, demands for liberal reform and claims of the right to self-government seem to be on the verge of breaking through in that difficult region.

The key to turning these random sounds of discontent into the beginnings of a symphony of self-government is, of course, success in Iraq. Here, the last month's news—the mainstream media to the contrary notwithstanding—is promising. Bush's reelection victory; the successful offensive in Falluja and the failure of the "Sunni street" to rise up in outrage; the inability of both the terrorists and antidemocratic political forces to deter the Iraqi and American governments from moving ahead with the January 30 elections; the president's willingness to increase U.S. troop levels, and his commitment to victory—all of this enables one to be cautiously optimistic about the prospects in Iraq.

And if Iraq goes well, the allegedly "utopian" and "Wilsonian" dreams of fundamental change in the broader Middle East won't look so far-fetched. Failure in Iraq, it's widely recognized, would be an utter disaster. What's less widely recognized is that the rewards of victory could be considerable. The most obvious and tangible benefits would of course be for the Iraqi people, and secondarily for American geopolitical credibility. But the indirect effects in the Middle East should not be underestimated.

Consider just the following comments made in the last couple of weeks in the Arab media, brought to our attention and translated by the invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute:

It is outrageous, and amazing, that the first free and general elections in the history of the Arab nation are to take place in January: in Iraq, under the auspices of American occupation, and in Palestine, under the auspices of the Israeli occupation. . . .

It is well and good for the Arabs to demand the right of political representation for [Iraq's] Sunni Arabs out of concern for them in the face of the tyranny of the other Iraqi groups and out of concern for national unity and the ideal relative representation. But we do not understand why this concern does not apply to the many Arab countries that do not permit their minorities to announce their existence, let alone their right to [political] representation. . . .

It is sad and pathetic that the eyes of the entire world are upon the Palestinian and Iraqi elections that will be held under the

lances of foreign occupation, while the peoples of the "independent, free, and sovereign" Arab countries have no way of expressing their will.

*Salameh Nematt, Washington bureau chief
for the London-based daily Al Hayat, November 25*

Some of the [Arab League] members . . . maintain that the Baghdad government is not legitimate. Why? They argue that it is not elected and was appointed by the American occupation. This widespread view has some basis. . . . However, the talk of the illegitimacy of the [Iraqi] government. . . . allows us to raise questions regarding most of the regimes in the region . . . some of which emerged as a result of coups or internal conspiracies, when no one asked the people what it thought.

*Abdel Rahman al-Rashed,
director-general of Al Arabia TV, writing
in the London-based daily Al Sharq Al Awsat, November 24*

We are not being fair to the current Iraqi government. Not me, nor you, nor the other guest on this program, not even the viewers, but history will do justice to them. These people are establishing the first democracy in the Middle East. This country will be a platform for liberties in the whole region. In Iraq, the days of a leader who remains on his throne until he dies are gone. This is over. For the first time the Iraqi leader will be elected by Iraqi ballots.

*Egyptian journalist Nabil Sharaf al-Din, speaking on
Al Jazeera TV about the future of Iraq, November 23*

No one can be confident how widely these sentiments are shared, or how quickly these views can penetrate so as to have real political effect. And obviously the road to democracy will be a rocky one, with twists and turns along the way, and outcomes that will not be entirely to our liking. But suddenly, with the election in Afghanistan, with the forthcoming elections in the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, with voices of change being heard in the Arab world, Bush's "idealistic" project looks surprisingly realistic. This puts a greater burden on the Bush administration to be more serious about improving the execution of its Middle East strategy, both in Iraq and elsewhere. But it does suggest that with thoughtful and energetic execution, the strategy can begin to show important and far-reaching results.

—William Kristol

Putin Gambles Big—and Loses

He needs a new Ukraine policy; we need a new Russia policy. **BY MICHAEL McFAUL**

AS THIS ARTICLE goes to press, it remains uncertain who will emerge the winner of Ukraine's presidential election. The official tally favored Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich by 3 percentage points, but momentum is with opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, whom exit polls showed to be the actual winner. All credible electoral monitors denounced the vote as fraudulent, as did even one election commission official.

Tens of thousands of Yushchenko supporters remain mobilized on the streets of Kiev. The Ukrainian parliament has swung behind Yushchenko, the Supreme Court has annulled the election and called for a new vote, some of the prime minister's supporters have defected, and the guys with the guns have sent mixed signals about whether they would obey orders to repress the demonstrators.

Yet, the *ancien régime* has not given up. Pro-Yanukovich governors in eastern Ukraine have threatened to secede, and the lame duck president, Leonid Kuchma, is trying to secure constitutional amendments that would weaken presidential power as a condition of allowing a new election. If the stalemate drags on, the demonstrators' mood could shift, towards either radicalism or disappointment.

Whoever wins, Russian president Vladimir Putin is a clear loser. No matter what the endgame, Putin has

suffered a serious setback because of the way he tried to deal with his most important neighbor. Putin's behavior has weakened Russia's influence in strategic Ukraine and damaged the Russian president's reputation in the West. It should call into question the Bush administration's embrace of the Kremlin leader.

Putin fancies himself a foreign policy pragmatist, adept at defending Russian national interests in a rational, dispassionate manner. In Ukraine, however, he has been exposed as a leader still driven by outdated ideological constructs like "spheres of influence" and "East versus West." The result is Putin's greatest foreign policy disaster since he took office four years ago.

In Ukraine, Putin made his first aggressive attempt to consolidate "managed democracy"—his advisers' term for Russia's new regime-type—in another country. Hoping to prevent a democratic breakthrough like those in Serbia in 2000 and Georgia in 2003, Putin's administration orchestrated a giant effort, first to aid Yanukovich's electoral campaign, then after the vote to blur the world's understanding of the results. (Kuchma's own government needed no technical assistance from Russia to carry out the actual fraud—adding votes to precincts, some of which then reported 100 percent turnout, with over 90 percent voting for Yanukovich.)

Campaign consultants tied to the Kremlin set up shop in Kiev, millions of Russian rubles poured into the Yanukovich war chest, and Putin personally visited Ukraine twice to campaign for the prime minister. On Election Day, Russia sent its own observer

mission, which pronounced—surprise, surprise—the vote free and fair. Putin congratulated Yanukovich on his victory well before the official results were released.

But this effort was all for nothing. Putin's advisers accurately foresaw that Yushchenko and his supporters would protest the stolen election, and they expected some perfunctory criticism from mid-level diplomats in the West. But they also calculated that Ukrainian protesters would eventually go home to escape the cold. And they reasoned that the West, especially the Bush administration, would soon forget about the fraud, as more important issues like the war on terrorism resumed their rightful place at center stage.

Putin's advisers were wrong, about both Ukrainian democrats and Western leaders. The opposition had prepared for this moment for years. Within hours of the announcement of the fraudulent results, Yushchenko supporters were pouring into the streets, ready to stay for the long haul. Then, as if in concert, every democratic government in the world refused to recognize the result. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated categorically, "We cannot accept this result as legitimate because it does not meet international standards and because there has not been an investigation of the numerous and credible reports of fraud and abuse."

Now that Putin's attempt to wield "soft power" in Ukraine has backfired, there are no good outcomes for Russia.

If Yushchenko eventually becomes president, the setback for Putin is obvious. Remember, the candidate for whom Putin aggressively campaigned has a criminal record (robbery and assault) and is closely tied to corrupt oligarchic networks in the southeastern city of Donetsk, whose surrogates tried to poison Yushchenko to get him out of the race. After Putin's intervention, a President Yushchenko would have every right to adopt anti-Russian policies.

It did not have to be this way. If

Michael McFaul is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and teaches political science at Stanford University. He is coauthor, with James Goldgeier, of Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War (Brookings, 2003).



Peter Steiner

Putin had been motivated by Russian national interests alone, he would not have invested his personal reputation in a candidate as unattractive and corrupt as Yanukovich. He would have stayed on the sidelines during the campaign, reached out to the winner after the vote, and mediated national reconciliation.

In that scenario, Yushchenko would have bent over backwards to meet with Putin and prove to ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine that he was a uniter, not a divider. Putin might have been able to guarantee Kuchma's retirement somewhere in Russia (useful, since Kuchma has been accused of ordering the murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgy Gongadze), and he might even have secured a commitment from Yushchenko to make Russian a second official language in Ukraine.

In addition, before the radicalizing

events of the fall campaign, Yushchenko was more likely to have been friendly to Russian investors in Ukraine, in contrast with Prime Minister Yanukovich, who has made money for himself and his cronies by keeping economic competitors out of Donetsk. Putin's blunders during the election make a cooperative relationship less likely now.

In the wake of last week's events, a Yanukovich victory would be no triumph for Russian foreign policy. If Yanukovich or someone from his camp manages to become Ukraine's next leader, he will spend his entire term trying to hold the country together and avoid civil war. Ukraine will stand in the same relation to Russia that Poland did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War—an ally in name, an oppressed and hostile society in reality.

So Putin loses either way. At this stage, only a major strategic mistake by Yushchenko and the opposition—a spontaneous eruption of violence in downtown Kiev or the adoption of a new, strident position in the negotiations underway to defuse the crisis—could offer Putin a face-saving exit.

Paradoxically, democracy in Ukraine is strengthened when an American “ally”—Russia—pursues a misbegotten foreign policy. Putin not only had the wrong objective in Ukraine, he also proved unable to construct a strategy for achieving it. Is this really the kind of partner President Bush should cultivate? As Bush assembles his new foreign policy team for the second term, perhaps it's time to reassess his Russia policy.

When he first came to office, President Bush made a strategic decision to develop a personal relationship with Putin as a means to achieve important foreign policy goals. Before September 11, what was important to Bush was national missile defense, which required, for diplomatic reasons, Putin's acquiescence to the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. Thanks to his rapport with Putin, Bush got what he wanted. That's good diplomacy.

For a while, the close bond between the two also served American interests in the aftermath of September 11. Putin sided unequivocally with the United States in the war on terror and provided real assistance to the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan.

Since Afghanistan, however, it is difficult to identify any American foreign policy objectives that Putin has helped us to achieve. The Russian president is not much of an asset in fighting the global war on terror. Putin's ruthless and unsuccessful war against Chechnya, where the death toll of well over 100,000 in the last decade has reached genocidal proportions, has not defeated Islamic radicals, but inspired them. Nor is Putin a champion of American nonproliferation efforts, especially in places like Iran, where Russians continue to build a nuclear reactor and transfer

nuclear know-how, despite overwhelming evidence that Iran has been hiding a secret nuclear weapons program for years.

But Putin does most harm to Bush's foreign policy agenda precisely in situations like the crisis in Ukraine, where Putin is actively undermining democracy. Since September 11, Bush has made the promotion of liberty abroad one of the central pillars of his foreign policy. After his reelection, he has the opportunity to make his liberty doctrine his greatest foreign policy legacy.

To date, the Bush administration's response to events in Ukraine has served that legacy well. Bush officials have rejected Moscow's attempt to frame the crisis as a struggle between East and West, insisting instead that the battle is between supporters and foes of democracy. But Ukraine also shows the difficulty of maintaining the fiction that Bush's promotion of democracy in Ukraine is compatible with his indifference to autocracy in Russia.

The moment is ripe for a new approach to Putin and Putin's Russia. On issues of nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and ending regional conflicts in the states of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. government still has real business to do with the government of Russia. State-to-state cooperation, facilitated by personal ties between our presidents, must not only continue, but grow.

In parallel and at the same time, however, Bush must develop a real strategy for bringing his message of liberty to Russia. Bush should be able to work constructively with his Kremlin counterpart without having to check his values at the door. This dual-track diplomacy, which worked so well for Ronald Reagan in dealing with his Kremlin counterparts (even before Gorbachev came to power), must be attempted again.

On that score, Ukraine offers several lessons.

First, words matter. The demonstrators on the streets of Kiev

cheered when they heard Colin Powell's hard-hitting message rejecting the results of the presidential vote. Speaking the truth about democratic rollback inside Russia will similarly inspire the democrats there.

Second, a united Western voice matters. The United States and Europe both strongly denounced the fraudulent elections in Ukraine. Had a major European leader defected and reached out to Yanukovich, the West's positive influence in this crisis would have been greatly diminished. A common Western message about the seriousness of Putin's antidemocratic policies currently does not exist. It should.

Third, assistance matters. European and American support for Ukrainian civil society helped election monitors, exit pollsters, and independent journalists who told the truth about the fraudulent vote. In turn, this has inspired democrats in Kiev, London, Kharkiv, and Paris to stand firm. Rather than cutting funds earmarked for democracy-building and educational exchanges with Russia, the Bush administration should expand those programs dramatically.

Finally, the pull of the West matters. Most Ukrainians want to live in a normal, prosperous, and boring Europe. To bring Ukraine into such a community, they fully understand that democratic consolidation is a precondition, while reversion to autocracy would doom them to pariah status like Belarus, the last full-blown dictatorship in Europe. Similar incentives for reform must be offered to the Russians, most of whom also want to live in a normal, prosperous, boring country considered part of Europe. In this sense, the eastern border of Europe, whether defined as NATO or the European Union, can never be finally fixed.

Russian democrats face a far greater challenge today than does the opposition in Ukraine. But as they press their long and difficult struggle, first to stop and then to reverse the establishment of authoritarian rule in Russia, they should at least know that we are on their side. ♦

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They Still Haven't Figured Him Out

Bush's unexpected qualities.

BY FRED BARNES

A DEMOCRATIC SENATOR who attended a special screening of the movie *Fahrenheit 9/11* was asked what he thought was the most revealing part about President Bush. The senator pondered a moment, then said it was the episode where Bush, in close-up, continues to talk to a grade-school class in Sarasota, Florida, for six or seven minutes after he's learned that planes had flown into the World Trade Center. What did it reveal? The senator couldn't say.

My impression, as Bush begins his second term in the White House, is that many in the political community, including the press, still haven't figured him out. One reason is the Bush presidency has emerged quite differently from what was expected. So here are five things about the president that help explain why he does what he does. They aren't the only five aspects of his presidency, but they're five important ones.

★ **ACTIVIST.** The label is usually applied to liberal politicians, rarely conservatives. In Bush's case, it means he has a lengthy agenda and is impatient about enacting it. And it's an agenda—Social Security reform, altering the balance on the Supreme Court, tax reform, reversing cultural trends, a crusade for democracy around the globe—for change. Bush didn't get his activist streak from his

father. George H.W. Bush was a caretaker president, dealing with items as they arrived in his in-basket. He lost his bid for reelection in 1992 partly because he didn't have much on his mind for a second term. Bush has a lot, and it's not trivial. One of his most stinging criticisms is to label a proposal "smallball"—in other words,



Bush with Rove, the "architect" of his victory

not big or bold enough for serious presidential attention.

★ **OUTSIDER.** Bush is an alien inside the Beltway. His election was the equivalent of getting a green card to work in Washington. He's not part of the social whirl. Nor has he made many close friends on Capitol Hill or around town. What separates him from the Washington crowd? More

than anything else, it's religion. Bush is the first president who's a product of the modern evangelical movement, which means his Christian faith is personal, intense, and all-encompassing. It's not a part-time, Sunday-only thing. Leave Washington and you frequently encounter people who say of the president, "He's one of us." You don't hear that in Washington. A Texas friend recently sent the president a copy of Natan Sharansky's book, *The Case for Democracy*. Bush read most of it and asked Sharansky to meet with him at the White House. Bush praised Sharansky for his years as a dissident in the Soviet Union. To which Sharansky replied, "Now you are the chief dissident of the world."

★ **PRESS-BASHER.** Bush has not made peace with the press, far from it.

He views most reporters as political opponents eager to pepper him with gotcha questions. In Colombia last month, he appeared before reporters with President Alvaro Uribe. Bush didn't like the first question about a scuffle two days earlier involving the Secret Service. "This is a question?" he said, and gave a curt answer. Uribe said, "Do you want to get in one more [question]?" Bush said, "That's plenty. No. Thank you," ending the press conference prematurely.

Bush believes, correctly, that the Washington press corps favored John Kerry in the election. "Ninety percent for Kerry" is what White House aides say. Coverage of Bush reflected this. The Center for Media and Public Affairs found that coverage of

Kerry was the most favorable for any presidential candidate since it began examining campaigns in 1988, while Bush's was mostly negative. Reporters complain they get little information from the White House. Chances are they'll get even less in the second term. Bush's calculation is that spending more time with the press would be time poorly spent.

Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

★ **SURPRISE.** Bush likes to defy the conventional wisdom. He often does it without even trying. I recently asked a leading supporter of Israel if he had known Bush would become the most pro-Israel president ever. He hadn't. Bush was expected to govern as a moderate conservative, but on most issues he's become hard core. He was expected to relax after November 2. Instead, he's plotting for next year. Presidents, indeed most politicians, are disinclined to give aides credit for their success. But Bush surprised Washington on the day after his reelection by calling Karl Rove "the architect" of his victory. The conventional wisdom is that Bush endorsed a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage to help win reelection but won't actually push it. The surprise of his second term may be that he pushes it aggressively.

★ **VISIONARY.** Really. True, the word just doesn't seem to go with the Bush persona, or at least with the popular notion of Bush, the swaggering Texan. But in speech after speech, Bush has laid out a vision of democratizing the Middle East, then the world. In Halifax, Nova Scotia, last week, he pretended Canada shares his "great commitment . . . to enhance our own security by promoting freedom and hope and democracy in the broader Middle East." Most of Europe and Bush's own State Department disagree with this effort. But Bush is adamant. "It is cultural condescension to claim that some peoples or some cultures or some religions are destined to despotism and unsuited for self-government," he said in Halifax. With little fanfare, Bush also changed America's national security strategy from containment to preemption.

So where does all this leave us in understanding Bush? The first step is to abandon the original preconception of President Bush. He's different. The second step is to accept that he's attempting big things. And the third, as a result, is to get ready for a second presidential term like few we've seen. ♦

Bias Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Yes, the media are overwhelmingly liberal.

BY ROBERT J. BARRO

THE ONGOING UPROAR over Dan Rather and CBS News has intensified concern about whether the mainstream media have a liberal bias. Some analyses, such as those by the Pew Research Center, document the strong tendency of journalists to describe themselves as liberal. This propensity—also prevalent, alas, among professors—is interesting but does not prove bias in coverage. Reporters might maintain objectivity despite their personal viewpoints, or the conservative leanings of most company owners might offset the liberal inclinations of the journalists.

In this spirit, in February 2003, the former *New York Times* executive editor Howell Raines said at a meeting of journalists: "Our greatest accomplishment as a profession is the development since World War II of a news-reporting craft that is truly nonpartisan." Paul Krugman went further in his *New York Times* column of November 8, 2002, when he asserted that the media actually had a *conservative* slant: "Some of the major broadcast media are simply biased in favor of the Republicans, while the rest tend to blur differences between the parties."

The question is, Who is right? Is there a left- or right-wing bias, or have the media actually managed to be objective? A serious assessment requires quantification of the output put forth by the media. The best analysis I know along these lines is

the ongoing study "A Measure of Media Bias," by professors Tim Groseclose of UCLA and Jeffrey Milyo of the University of Missouri.

These researchers use a clever statistical technique to construct an objective measure of conservative or liberal bias in the news coverage of major U.S. television and radio stations, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet. Their main finding is that the liberal inclination of the mainstream media is clear. Among 20 major outlets, Fox News and the *Washington Times* emerge as conservative, but the other 18 range from slightly to substantially left of center.

Groseclose and Milyo's analytical method begins not with the media but with the voting records of members of Congress. They use the well-known ratings of members' voting records issued by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), a self-described liberal organization. First, they adjust the members' ADA ratings for the 1990s to ensure comparability over time and between the House and Senate. The ADA score has a 0-100 scale, with 0 meaning that a legislator voted with the ADA 0 percent of the time and 100 signifying 100 percent agreement. The researchers use scores scaled to correspond to the House ratings in 1999. On this scale, the average ADA score for 1995-99 in the House and Senate was 50.1, when senators were weighted by state population, and the District of Columbia was assigned phantom liberal legislators. If members of Congress reflect the views of their constituents, we can view "50" as close to the position of the average voter.

Robert J. Barro is Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Among well-known liberal senators, John Kerry had an adjusted ADA rating of 88, close to Ted Kennedy's 89. On the conservative side, Bill Frist had 10, whereas John McCain had 13. Results closer to the center were Joe Lieberman's 74, John Breaux's 60, Arlen Specter's 51, and Olympia Snowe's 43.

The next step in the research is to measure the tendency of Senate and House members in their speeches to cite 200 prominent think tanks. Citations considered were limited to those that referred favorably to a view or fact reported by a think tank. For example, the Heritage Foundation was cited favorably by legislators whose average ADA rating was 20, substantially conservative. Also highly conservative were Americans for Tax Reform (19), the Family Research Council (20), the National Right to Life Committee (22), and the Christian Coalition (23). Liberal think tanks included the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (88), Citizens for Tax Justice (88), the Consumer Federation of America (82), the Economic Policy Institute (80), the National Organization for Women (79), and the NAACP (75).

The last step is to measure the tendency of 20 prominent media outlets to cite favorably the same 200 think tanks. An important point is that the researchers considered only programs or stories labeled "news." They excluded editorials, talk shows, and the like. The idea was to assess political bias in programs billed as news, not the more transparent slant contained in self-identified opinion pieces. The periods assessed ranged from 1990 to 2003. The researchers used these data to calculate, effectively, an ADA rating for each media outlet. The idea is that outlets that refer favorably to conservative think tanks are reasonably viewed as conservative, whereas those that refer favorably to liberal think tanks are plausibly labeled liberal.

The final product—shown in the table—is a list of ADA ratings for the 20 media outlets. Each rating can be compared with the congressional average of 50, which breaks down into 16 for Republicans and 84 for Democrats.

Adjusted ADA Scores for Media Outlets and Members of Congress

Media

Wall Street Journal	85.1
New York Times	73.7
CBS Evening News	73.7
LA Times	70.0
CBS Early Show	66.6
Washington Post	66.6
Newsweek	66.3
NPR Morning Edition	66.3
US News and World Report	65.8
Time Magazine	65.4
NBC Today Show	64.0
USA Today	63.4
NBC Nightly News	61.6
ABC World News Tonight	61.0
Drudge Report	60.4
ABC Good Morning America	56.1
CNN News Night with Aaron Brown	56.0
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer	55.8
Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume	39.7
Washington Times	35.4

Congress, 1995-99

All members	50.1
Democrats	84.3
Republicans	16.1

Source: Ongoing research by Professors Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo in their study, "A Measure of Media Bias." Calculations as of November 2004.

On the conservative end, the only two outlets below 50 were the *Washington Times* (35) and *Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume* (40). Although right of center, these ratings are much closer to the centrist position of 50 than to congressional Republicans' average position of 16.

The other 18 outlets are on the liberal side of 50. Particularly striking

are the high liberal ratings for the *New York Times* and *CBS Evening News* (both 74), not too far below the average score of 84 for Democratic members of Congress. The news programs of the other two traditional television networks are closer to the center—62 for *NBC Nightly News* and 61 for *ABC World News Tonight*.

The one Internet representative, the *Drudge Report*, comes in at 60, moderately left of center. The most balanced reporting shows up in the *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, *CNN News Night with Aaron Brown*, and ABC's *Good Morning America*, each of which had a score of 56. Interestingly, these balanced programs provided three of the four anchors for the main election debates—Jim Lehrer and Gwen Ifill from PBS and Charles Gibson from ABC. (It's hard to understand how Bob Schieffer from CBS made it in.)

One surprise is that the *Wall Street Journal's* news pages have the most liberal rating of all, 85, about the same as the typical Democrat in Congress. The rating for the *Journal's* editorial pages would of course look very different. (As one quipster observed, James Carville and Mary Matalin probably agree more often than the news and editorial divisions of the *Wall Street Journal*.)

The bottom line from the Groseclose-Milyo study is that the political slant of most of the mainstream media is far to the left of the typical member of Congress. Thus, if the political opinions of viewers, listeners, and readers are similar to those of their elected representatives, the political leanings of most of the media are far to the left of those of most of their customers. This mismatch suggests profit opportunities for conservative-oriented, or at least balanced, media outlets. Fox News is probably only the beginning. Maybe the next conservative entrant will be a recreated CBS News. ♦

The New Evil Empire?

Applying Cold War lessons to Saudi global mischief. **BY STEPHEN SCHWARTZ**

AS PRESIDENT BUSH prepares to begin his second term, he has an opportunity to turn a page in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia. In crafting his policy, the president should draw on American experience with another ideologically expansionist dictatorship—one successfully countered and transformed thanks in part to U.S. policy—the Soviet Union. The president may be aided in this by his former Sovietologist secretary of state-designate, Condoleezza Rice.

There are many telling parallels between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. First, the USSR led, and Saudi Arabia now leads, an ideological movement with global reach.

From the time of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union was the standard-bearer of international communism, and Moscow was Mecca for leftists. As the rulers of the world's first Communist state, the Soviet leaders had a reputation to live up to. Saudi Arabia similarly asserts leadership over all of Sunni Islam, the majority form of the religion. Mecca is the birthplace of Islam, and King Fahd, who holds the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, has an eminence he must justify.

Second, both are weakened by hypocrisy. Both Soviet and Saudi ideological claims amount to pretense at odds with social reality.

While Soviet communism pledged to its subjects and acolytes that the revolution would achieve prosperity, freedom, global prestige, and even

the human colonization of space, it delivered none of these. Shortages and deprivation characterized Russian daily life until the end of the Soviet system, as did censorship, repression, and forced labor. The economic system that Communist rulers from Lenin onward had argued would catch up with and surpass the West failed to manufacture a single consumer product competitive with a capitalist brand. Who on earth, given a choice, ever bought a Soviet razor or pen or, more recently, computer or car, except in Third World backwaters where clunky Ladas and Yugos were sold at a discount so low as to amount to the dumping of goods?

Saudi Arabia faces the same dilemma. It claims to uphold and exemplify the harsh, purified, stripped-down form of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism, which is the state religion. Wahhabis are forbidden to mix with other Muslims, and are indoctrinated to hate Shia Muslims as apostates, to angrily despise Christians, Jews, and Hindus, to eschew the pleasures of normal life—from picking flowers to listening to music to smiling. In the phrase so often heard among Wahhabi terrorists from Gaza to Falluja, they “love death by martyrdom more than life.”

Yet the House of Saud, the rulers of the kingdom, do not live by stern Wahhabi strictures. If anything, they flout them, with porno videos for entertainment inside their compounds, sex orgies in hotel suites when they go on vacation, and chilled vodka handed out by Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan in Washington and Aspen. Above all, the Saudi Wahhabis who preach the

destruction of the Judeo-Christian West and who incite Islamic youths to die in jihad in Iraq and elsewhere depend on the United States for their military and economic security.

Hypocrisy kills the soul and poisons the common identity that binds normal societies. Hypocrisy sapped the intellectual strength of the Soviet Union, just as it is undermining the Saudi way of life.

Third, and perhaps most important, totalitarian systems are weakened by the discontent of those forced to live under them. After 70 years of socialism, Soviet citizens got tired of the whole mess. They wanted out. The slogans and threats that first inspired, then intimidated, their grandparents and parents meant nothing any more.

The same is true in Saudi Arabia. The religious appeal of the old Wahhabism is greatly diminished, and many prosperous and responsible Saudi subjects are no longer willing to accept the constant abuses inflicted on them. Thanks to oil, they have the largest middle class in the Arab world, but they are prevented by Wahhabi extremists from enjoying a middle-class life.

The fourth parallel is the two powers' support for international troublemaking, which is an inevitable outcome of the first three sets of contradictions.

Because they had to prove their revolutionary faith, the bureaucrats of Moscow for decades maintained a gigantic, worldwide propaganda and disinformation effort. In addition, the need to demonstrate their zeal led them to turn over precious hard currency and weapons to every troublemaking gangster or deluded revolutionary in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America who crossed their path—from the Irish Republican Army to the thugs who starved Ethiopia, from Ho Chi Minh to Castro.

The Saudis, similarly, in order to justify their claim of Islamic authority—and to counter the ideological impact of the Iranian revolution of 1979—have sought to Wahhabize

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Sunni Muslims wherever they are found, from Morocco to Malaysia, from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Botswana, from northern Nigeria to Northern Virginia.

In the end, of course, change came to the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s, Moscow could no longer govern in the old way—and neither can Saudi Arabia's rulers today. The question is, What lessons drawn from the Soviet experience are applicable to Saudi Arabia today, as the Bush team ponders strategy for the second term?

One point is worth clearing up at the outset: Despite conventional wisdom to the contrary, oil is not an obstacle to transforming Saudi Arabia, any more than Soviet possession of nuclear weapons was a barrier to change in Moscow. Whoever rules Arabia will continue to seek revenue from oil.

At the same time, some contrasts between Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union must be kept in mind. The Soviets did not allow their subjects to massacre American citizens on U.S. soil, as the Saudis did, indirectly, by promoting extremism and permitting the buildup of al Qaeda. Nor did the Soviets fear their own disaffected beneficiaries, as the House of Saud fears al Qaeda. The Soviets did not tolerate the presence of activist radicals within their own borders who continually incited their subjects to terrorism. Even today, however, the Saudis continue to tolerate the Wahhabi clerics exemplified by the 26 Saudi imams who on November 5 issued a fatwa celebrating jihadist murder in Iraq.

In sum, by the mid-1980s, Soviet communism was moribund, while today, Wahhabism remains virulent. Therefore, we probably cannot hope for the complete dissolution of the Saudi state. Rather, the aim must be to assist the Saudi royal family to break the link between the state and the extremist ideology that has underpinned it for so long. The Saudi state may survive; the House of Saud may even, after the fashion of the Windsors, retain its wealth and its throne.



EPA / Landov / Mike Nelson

Saudi Arabian soldiers watch a fly-by of helicopters during the Hajj, January 2004.

With or without the princes, violence must be avoided: Bloodshed in the land of the Two Holy Cities would be extraordinarily inflammatory, not just in Arabia but across the Muslim world. A managed transition to normality is far preferable to any revolutionary upheaval in Saudi Arabia.

Another difference, this time propitious: Saudi Arabia has a precious asset that was missing from the Soviet Union in its growing business class. The largest middle class in the Arab world may be capable of leading the Saudi transformation peacefully, and avoiding the hard social bumps suffered when the Soviet Union fell.

That said, several lessons of the Soviet transformation remain urgently relevant to U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia:

(1) At the beginning of the Gorbachev era, the Soviet authorities demonstrated their desire for transparency in dealing with the United States when, as early as 1986, Gorbachev himself admitted to our government the truth about their long history of disinformation and “active measures” against us. Soviet diplomats came to Washington and accepted blame for circulating lying propaganda in the Third World, such as the claim that AIDS had been invented at Fort Detrick and that body parts were hacked out of infants in

Latin America for an imaginary black market in the United States. They promised to stop producing such garbage, and they kept their word.

A similar shift toward transparency is necessary in relations between Riyadh and Washington. As their first initiative, President Bush and Secretary Rice should call on the Saudis to produce a “9/11 Commission Report” of their own that can be made public. It must detail every aspect of the involvement of Saudi subjects in the al Qaeda conspiracy, no matter how high they rank in Saudi society.

(2) The Saudi financiers of al Qaeda—including such individuals as the property developer Yasin al-Qadi and the charity head Adil Abdaljalil Batterjee, both designated global terrorist financiers by the U.S. Treasury—continue to walk the streets of the kingdom unmolested. The president and the secretary of state should initiate legal steps so that all of them are arrested and tried.

(3) President Reagan correctly called on the Soviet Union to cease financing international extremism. George W. Bush has the right to ask that the Saudis cease not only supporting al Qaeda but also fomenting Wahhabism internationally in any guise. Above all, Riyadh must immediately

silence Saudi clerics' incitement to the Iraqi jihad, and cut off the flow of jihadists from Saudi Arabia into Iraq, if necessary by closing and patrolling the kingdom's northern border.

(4) The Russian state was eventually severed from the Communist party and its ideology. Only then could it become a more or less normal political structure. President Bush should impress upon the Saudis the wisdom of divorcing their state from Wahhabism.

(5) For decades, the United States brought pressure to bear on the Soviet Union in the name of human rights through such instruments as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. We should serve notice on the Saudi authorities that we will assist in every way possible domestic advocates of peaceful modernizing and democratizing reforms in the kingdom (just as the Bush Doctrine dictates we should do in Iran and across the Middle East).

(6) Finally, President Bush and Secretary Rice must remember Soviet history as they resist the blandishments of the détenteists—those who insist that all Saudi subjects idolize bin Laden, or that the only alternative to the present regime is chaos, or that the Saudis will change only through slow evolution and discreet pressure behind the scenes, or that direct engagement will simply insult and alienate them. Secretary Rice will recall that all these arguments were offered in the Soviet case—and all proved wrong. It was not détente that brought down the Soviet Union.

Saudi Arabia, with its commitment to promoting Islamic extremism worldwide, remains the key to defeating the terrorists we face. It is also a society in crisis. President Bush can choose to deal piecemeal with Islamist terrorism. Or, like Ronald Reagan confronting the Soviet Union, he can take on the problem itself, directly, carefully, calmly, but firmly, by dealing with its Saudi source. With Condoleezza Rice at his side, the president can apply the lessons of experience to the core challenge of his new term. ♦

A Senator Is Born

Complications attend Tom Coburn's return to Washington. BY KATHERINE MANGU-WARD

REPUBLICAN SENATOR-ELECT Tom Coburn is proud of the number of babies he has delivered, many of them on weekends while serving in the House of Representatives. But his participation in the miracle of life can't compete with his much-more-miraculous ability to walk on water. No one has actually seen him skip lightly across the waves, but after his remarkably thorough job of burning bridges at the close of his stint in the House, walking on water is the only way Coburn could have made it back across the Potomac.

Of his congressional colleagues he has said, "Most of them are egomaniacs. There are not many normal people up here." Having promised in 1994 when elected to limit himself to three terms in the House, he checked out in 2000 to go back to his Muskogee, Oklahoma, obstetrics practice, saying: "Six years is enough." On his senatorial campaign site, he sounds the same note: "As a citizen legislator, I rejected the Washington life-style and I returned to Oklahoma and my family every weekend and maintained my medical practice. I will do the same as a U.S. Senator."


After he left office in 2000,

Coburn founded Americans for Limited Government and wrote *Breach of Trust: How Washington Turns Outsiders Into Insiders*. He used the book to name names and rehash his vendettas with Newt Gingrich, Tom DeLay, and other leading Republicans. He compared corrupt Washington legislators to the Pharisees.

And when Coburn found himself in a tough primary this summer, it was payback time.

He did get the endorsements of a few of his former colleagues, but when it came to writing checks, his opponent, former Oklahoma City mayor Kirk Humphreys, received donations from at least 13 senators, totaling more than \$60,000. Coburn got none. In July, *The Hill* quoted one senior staff member disparaging Coburn's obstructionist style: "Coburn would throw himself on the train tracks instead of get control of the train."

But Coburn won the primary, and went on to beat Democrat Brad Carson by 12 points. The contest was ugly, with allegations that Coburn once sterilized a young woman without her permission surfacing late in the race. Coburn didn't shy away from inflammatory allegations either, albeit of a more general nature: "If you want to



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kill the American experiment," he said at one campaign event, "vote for Brad Carson."

Despite the fights he has picked, Coburn says that he's not afraid of the inevitable socially awkward moments in the Senate chamber. "They put their pants on like I do in the morning," he says.

Coburn is a living instruction manual on how easy it is to acquire a reputation as a straight-talker on Capitol Hill. News stories frequently refer to him as a "folk hero." And sure, he may have called Oklahoma state legislators "crapheads . . . that have killed the vision of anyone wanting to invest in Oklahoma," he may have characterized the governance of American Indian nations in Oklahoma as "primitive," and he may have published a book-length condemnation of his once and future colleagues in which he compared them to biblical villains. There's no doubt the man can turn a phrase. And Coburn him-

self would be the first to admit that the bar for straightforwardness in politicians is low. But for such a purportedly uncensored guy, he's being awfully cagey at the moment.

"I don't think now is the right time for me to comment on filibusters," he says to a question about a possible rules change that will have to be entertained on the first day of the session. But it was pretty clear what he thought about filibusters in 1999 in the House, when he staged what amounted to one of his own. He and fellow term-limiter Mark Sanford (now governor of South Carolina) offered 115 amendments to the agriculture bill, and succeeded in changing the way costs of appropriations bills were calculated before passage.

Asked what his legislative priorities are, he is vague: "Build the staff. Get to know the people. Get to talk to people. Get out there and show people that I am not the villain that they think I am right now."

This is not to say that his positions on the issues are unclear. His final year in the House, Coburn earned a 0 percent approval rating from Planned Parenthood on key votes, a 0 percent from the Human Rights Campaign, a 0 percent rating from the National Organization for Women, 100 percent from the Christian Coalition, and 100 percent from U.S. Border Control. His campaign website contains unequivocal statements like "Jerusalem is the Capital of Israel. Period," and "I oppose any increase in federal funding for the arts and support elimination of the National Endowment for the Arts."

Coburn hasn't yet spoken with Majority Leader Bill Frist about his plans for his first term. "He's pretty busy right now. There'll be plenty of time to talk to him later. I'll be sure to talk to him later." Given Coburn's reputation, Frist might be forgiven for hearing a faint note of menace in those words. ♦



Michael Ramirez

Iran's West Bank Ambitions

Are the mullahs planning a takeover of Palestinian politics? **BY AARON MANNES**

WHILE THE VACUUM in Palestinian politics created by Yasser Arafat's death may seem like a great opportunity for moderates to assume power, the force best organized to take control is actually the Syrian- and Iranian-backed terrorist group Hezbollah. If Hezbollah succeeds, Palestinians will be condemned to continue their confrontation with Israel, and the impact on the balance of power in the Middle East and the global war on terror will be profound.

Iran and Hezbollah are both Shia Islamist, but they support terrorist groups (including al Qaeda) across ideological and sectarian lines. With a secure base in Lebanon, loyal patrons in Syria and Iran, extensive financial resources, and control of the Al Manar satellite channel, Hezbollah is a potent ally for any terrorist. But Hezbollah's greatest asset is its reputation for effectiveness. In the early 1980s, Hezbollah drove peacekeepers from Beirut by truck-bombing the U.S. and French barracks. Around the same time, it also conducted a hostage-taking campaign in Lebanon that manipulated the United States and France, causing scandals in both countries. In May 2000, Israel withdrew from Lebanon after 15 years of fighting with Hezbollah, inspiring the Palestinians to believe that Israel could be defeated.

Iran and Hezbollah have provided funds, weapons, and training to Palestinian terrorists. Many of the intifa-

da's most successful tactics were learned from Hezbollah. But all this assistance came at a price. According to Israeli intelligence, Iran is now "in control of terrorism in Israel."

Most small leftist Palestinian organizations are based in Syria and have close relationships with Hezbollah. Palestinian Islamic Jihad receives a majority of its funding from Iran and cooperates with Hezbollah. Hamas is also falling into Hezbollah's orbit. Israel's crackdown on Hamas's leadership has created an opening for Hezbollah. Hamas's political leadership is now exclusively Syria-based, and Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon direct Hamas operations.

Hezbollah has also infiltrated Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, the leading Palestinian institutions. Officers in Arafat's personal bodyguard, Force 17, directed the first Hezbollah cells in the West Bank and Gaza. In exchange for providing arms such as those on the *Karine A*—the arms-smuggling freighter intercepted by Israel in January 2002—Iran was allowed to open hospitals and social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. These institutions serve as a cover for an expanded Iranian presence. In late 2002, a captured Palestinian agent for Hezbollah confessed to Israeli security that Hezbollah had established a network of supporters in the West Bank and Gaza to infiltrate Fatah and the PA in order to take control when the PA collapses. Even Arafat complained about Iranian infiltration, telling reporters in mid-October, "[Iranian Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei is working against us. He is giving money to all these fanatical groups. Khamenei is a troublemaker."

The captured Hezbollah agent also stated that he reported both to Iran and to senior Fatah/PLO leader Farouq Qaddumi. A Fatah founder and opponent of the Oslo process, Qaddumi lives in Tunisia and has never traveled to the West Bank or Gaza. Yet Qaddumi recently brokered an agreement to reopen Fatah offices in Damascus (Syria had closed them in 1985). In the wake of Arafat's death, Qaddumi was appointed head of Fatah, and he would be a plausible Palestinian frontman for Hezbollah and its proxies.

Elections are no panacea against Hezbollah's influence, which extends into every Palestinian faction. For one thing, no potential Palestinian leader has much popular support. Nor are there any well-organized Palestinian groups poised to counter Hezbollah's influence. So, Hezbollah, which has its own satellite channel and has been an effective political party in Lebanon, could be the crucial factor in Palestinian elections.

The consequences of an Iranian takeover of Palestinian politics would be grave. Judging from the number of terror attacks, the intifada is burning itself out. But Hezbollah could stoke the flames, making the Palestinians pawns to Iranian and Syrian strategic ends. This power play could then have a regional and even international impact. Hamas and Hezbollah have both opened offices in Iraq, and the Palestinians may prove ready recruits for the jihad against the United States. With a predominantly Palestinian population, strategic, pro-Western Jordan may be vulnerable to a Palestinian-Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis. Also, the Palestinian terrorists bring assets that could augment Hezbollah's world-spanning terrorist network.

Arafat was a terrorist who locked the Palestinian people into a futile cycle of death and defeat. Perhaps his passing will lead to new, moderate Palestinian leadership. But in politics the advantage goes to the organized, and Hezbollah and its patrons have been preparing for this moment for some time. ♦

Aaron Mannes is the author of Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Rowman & Littlefield-JINSA Press, October 2004).

The 200-Year Duel

Two centuries after their famous forebears met on the banks of the Hudson, the Hamiltons and the Burrs are still at it.

BY MATTHEW CONTINETTI

“Look at this,” said Antonio Burr. “Look at what they’re selling.” Standing in the gift shop of the New-York Historical Society on Manhattan’s Upper West Side, Burr held a magnet to the light. On it were portraits of his ancestor Aaron Burr, the third vice president of the United States, and Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury, whom Vice President Burr killed in a duel 200 years ago. Each man’s portrait stared coldly at the other’s.

It was a dull gray day in late October, and Burr had just spent an hour walking through “Alexander Hamilton: The Man Who Made Modern America,” the blockbuster, \$5 million bicentennial exhibition that opened in early September and will close on February 28. The show portrays Hamilton as a giant—a leading champion of the Constitution, the Founding Father of America’s financial institutions, the visionary who saw that the United States would one day become an economic and military superpower. To Hamilton’s many admirers, all this is beyond dispute. Not to Antonio Burr.

He is a small man, compact and bespectacled, with a graying goatee and pale blue eyes. He is 51 years old. Also, he is Chilean. He often ends sentences with “man.” Sometimes he flails his arms wildly to make a point.

“This is what I don’t understand,” he continued, examining the magnet. “This whole exhibition, it criticizes Burr, it calls Burr a man without principle, it blames Burr for Hamilton’s death. But when you get to the gift shop, what do you have? You have them selling Burr and Hamilton together. Look at this.”

He motioned to a stack of T-shirts with Hamilton and

Burr’s portraits on them, to a Hamilton-Burr mug, to a Hamilton-Burr keychain.

“But they still don’t give Burr any respect,” he said. “They still don’t treat him as an equal.”

Burr moved into the Historical Society’s main foyer. Two bronze statues stood in the center of the hall, lifesize replicas of Burr and Hamilton (each 5’7”), shown just before the fatal duel. The Hamilton statue looked frail. It wore a pair of wire-rim glasses. Aaron Burr’s statue was grimacing.

“My problem here, with this exhibit, is that this is hagiography,” Antonio Burr said.

His voice echoed off the museum’s stone walls.

“This is the life of a saint,” he went on. “The whole story—Burr’s story—isn’t told.”

He shook his head in frustration.

Here’s why. For Antonio Burr, the lionization of Hamilton unfailingly

means the demonization of his forebear. He’s not alone in thinking so. Some of Aaron Burr’s descendants have been working to advance their man’s reputation for a very long time. And their numbers have grown. There are about 70 of them now, all smart and engaging people like Antonio Burr, and it was at their instigation that the town of Weehawken, New Jersey, agreed to host a reenactment of the Hamilton-Burr duel last July, on its 200th anniversary, with Antonio Burr in the role of his accursed ancestor. With the reenactment, the efforts of Burr’s defenders seemed at last to pay off, for a few fleeting moments.

The story of the duel begins sometime after 5 A.M. on July 11, 1804, when the vice president of the United States and the former secretary of the treasury left their homes in New York City, met their seconds at docks along the Hudson, and rowed, in separate boats, across the river to the dueling grounds in Weehawken. The journey took two hours.



The duelers’ pistols

Touchstone

Matthew Continetti is a reporter at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Back then the Weehawken cliffs were sparsely populated, densely covered with trees, and seemingly impregnable. Yet twice a day, at low tide, the water receded from the foot of the cliffs, exposing a gravelly beach where a boat could land. A path led from the beach to a ledge about 20 feet above the water that was long and narrow and ideal for dueling. At least 70 duels were fought there, and at least 36 men were killed there, including Hamilton.

The rivalry that culminated in the infamous duel was long in the making. Hamilton and Burr had first known each other as young lawyers in Albany, New York. Then during the Revolutionary War both served on General Washington's staff, where the bilingual Hamilton often acted as interpreter for America's French allies, including the Marquis de Lafayette. For this and other reasons (one probably apocryphal story has Washington catching Burr reading his correspondence), the general's favorite was Hamilton.

The future duelists' rivalry deepened over time. Hamilton thought Burr a man without principle; Burr—whose political career included stints as New York attorney general and U.S. senator, before he tied Thomas Jefferson in the Electoral College in the 1800 presidential election and so became vice president—thought Hamilton a schemer. He was convinced Hamilton was seeking to subvert him. Hamilton was a Federalist, Burr a Democrat, and the newspapers associated with each man cast aspersions on the other. Eventually the two grew bitter and desperate. As the Federalists' power waned, Hamilton's influence began to seep away. Vice President Burr, for his part, lost the 1804 New York gubernatorial race by one of the largest margins ever.

A few months after that defeat, Burr learned that Hamilton had expressed a "despicable opinion" of him at a dinner party. Soon afterward he issued the challenge to a duel. An exchange of letters ensued. Hamilton had several opportunities to apologize for his remark, but refused each. And so the two, meeting at Weehawken that July morning, raised their .54-caliber pistols in the air, then lowered them, then fired. Hamilton was struck and fell.


He died the next day. Burr's reputation lay in ruins. "Two weeks after the duel," write Mike Wallace and Edwin G. Burrows in *Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898*, "facing a murder indictment and fearing his house would be attacked by a mob," Burr left New York and disappeared "into obloquy everlasting."

Not quite. Within a month, Burr was indicted for murder in New York (though, in an era when laws against dueling were seldom enforced, he would never be tried). Lying low, he spent a couple of months on an island off the Georgia coast before returning to the capital. He had a dramatic flair, and liked to speak of "my friend Hamilton, whom I shot." His term as vice president ended in 1805. Two years later, Burr attempted to foment war with Spain, and was tried for treason. Acquitted, he left for Europe, where he remained until 1812. He died in 1836, alone in a Staten Island hotel, forgotten.

In death, by contrast, Hamilton became a martyr. And while his historical standing has waxed and waned over the years, he is now securely embedded in the Founders' pantheon. "Except for Washington," writes Ron Chernow, author of a magisterial new biography, "nobody stood closer to the center of American politics from 1776 to 1800 or cropped up at more turning points."

Nobody indeed. Even before assuming his place on the national stage, Hamilton had founded the Bank of New York, the New York *Evening Post* (now the *New York Post*), and the antislavery New York Manumission Society. Then he moved to the seat of power, as a delegate to the Confederation Congress, the Constitutional Convention, and the New York constitutional ratification convention. He never left.

Hamilton's intellectual accomplishments begin with his political writings. He masterminded the *Federalist*, the classic defense of the Constitution, coming up with the pseudonym "Publius," recruiting coauthors James Madison and John Jay, and writing 51 of the 85 essays himself. Along with the Constitution, the *Federalist* is America's chief contribution to Western political thought.



Hamilton's portions, dealing with the executive and judicial branches, the Senate, national defense, and taxation, laid the foundation for the federal government as it exists to this day.

Next come Hamilton's theories of economic growth and national strength. He believed that in order for America to become a powerful nation—he often used the word “empire”—it would have to pursue technological innovation, create markets and industries, and develop a strong army and navy. He pursued these goals relentlessly. As secretary of the treasury, he wrote the famous *Report on American Manufactures*, which presciently argued that America's future was in industry, not agriculture.

He then started one of the first manufacturing societies in Paterson, New Jersey.

In Hamilton's day the treasury was larger than all other government agencies combined, and he used the power of his office maximally when he founded the Bank of the United States and nationalized the debt, taking on the credit burdens of the various states. This move, controversial at the time, bound the states' financial futures together, creating one vibrant national economy out of 13 squabbling ones.

Then, too, there is Hamilton's compelling life story. He was born illegitimate on Nevis island in the Caribbean in 1755. His father abandoned the family when he was 10. His mother died two years later. But a group of island merchants spotted his talents and paid for his education at King's College in New York (now Columbia University). From there, after the interlude in Albany, came the tour as aide-de-camp to Washington. In his rapid ascent to power, Hamilton was the ultimate American self-made man.

There's no getting around the fact that Burr was different. He was a patrician, for one thing. His major accomplishment—beyond serving heroically in the Revolutionary War—was organizing a political machine in New York that helped deliver the 1800 election to the Democrats and secured his position as vice president. While Hamilton was busy creating a nation, Burr was busy creating a polit-

ical coalition. Burr “was a smart, clever man, and he said a number of funny things,” the historian Richard Brookhiser, who curated the Historical Society's exhibition, has said. “But he was an empty narcissist.”


Two hundred years ago, of course, those would have been fighting words.

The township of Weehawken occupies a thin strip of land along the New Jersey shore of the Hudson River, directly opposite the steel and glass cages of Midtown Manhattan. Every weekday morning and evening, the town's population balloons, as commuter cars and buses and trucks pour along Interstate-495 as it bisects Weehawken, before spiraling downward into the maw of the Lincoln Tunnel. Since the tunnel opened in 1937, the waterfront has been dominated by the access roads, empty lots, construction trailers, backhoes, orange cones, and ventilation shafts necessary for its construction and upkeep.

A grassy plaza called Lincoln Harbor park survives on one corner of the waterfront, however, and it was here that about 2,000 people turned out last July 11 to watch descendants of Hamilton and Burr reenact the duel.

There were old people and young people and children and pets. They sat under a hot sun for hours. Families sat in the grass, seniors sat under the trees, and politicians and visiting dignitaries sat on a dais overlooking the stage. Weehawken's mayor, a man named Richard Turner, was there. So was Jim McGreevey, then still the governor.

A whole day's worth of activities had been planned: an early morning wreath-laying commemorating the duel, then introductory speeches from New Jersey politicians, then the reenactment, then the dedication of a commemorative plaque at the top of the Weehawken cliffs, and then, finally, a panel discussion featuring academics and biographers. There was a gentle breeze coming off the river, and a festive atmosphere to the proceedings.





Hamilton descendants wore bright red T-shirts emblazoned with John Trumbull's portrait of their forebear. Along the park's perimeter were booths selling bottled water, T-shirts, medallions, stamps, and coins. There was a booth for reporters and photographers and a special seating area for scholars. Richard Brookhiser was there, delivering impromptu lectures to anyone who was interested.

Apparently not everyone had come for love of history. "Alexander Hamilton's cool," said a man in a yellow golf shirt. "You gotta respect the guy who invented the telephone."

"The guy who went down—he was partial to Jersey, right?" asked a big-bellied man with tousled hair and dirty clothes. He looked as if he'd spent the night in the park. "If he'd lived," he went on, "all the skyscrapers would've been in Jersey, right?" (Wrong.)

Others joked at the anticlimactic nature of the event. "I got Burr with 2 to 1 odds," someone said. A preppy young man approached a girl and said, lamely, "So . . . what's your affiliation with Hamilton?"

Others, however, had a serious, quasi-professional interest in Hamilton and Burr. There was Scott Lindsay, a student at Georgetown University, and the president of the Alexander Hamilton Historical Society. He spent the moments before the reenactment handing out business cards and warning passersby that Hamilton was under attack. "There are people out there who want to replace Hamilton on the \$10 bill with Reagan," he muttered darkly.

There were the Burr partisans, too, of course. All of them, including Antonio Burr, were members of the Aaron Burr Association, established in 1946 to "make known the patriotic contributions of Colonel Aaron Burr

to our country, both during the War of the American Revolution and during the period of American history which followed that war." While the Hamilton descendants treated the reenactment mainly as an excuse for a family reunion, the Aaron Burr Association saw it as a crucial chance to prove their man's worth.

"It's going to be a very amicable affair," Stuart Johnson, president of the association, said over lunch a few days before the reenactment. In organizing the event, his group had shown gracious flexibility. "We submitted a proposed script to the Weehawken Planning Commission," he said, but "they decided that it was too anti-Hamilton."

Not without reason. The original script had Hamilton clearly shooting first. Plus, the Burr association wanted Douglas Hamilton, the Ohio computer salesman who portrayed his ancestor, to fall to the ground. Hamilton was leery.

Eventually the Burr people conceded both points. The narrator would say only that historians were uncertain who had shot first, and after he was shot the man playing Hamilton would drop to one knee. On the big issues, though—Hamilton had supplied pistols with hair-triggers of which Burr was unaware; the challenge was the fruit of a 15-year rivalry; Hamilton had passed up several chances to escape his doom—the Aaron Burr Association got its way.

"Because we gave in, and bowed to the suggestions of the Weehawken Historical Commission, the Hamilton people joined in on it," Johnson told me. He sounded pleased. It was, he said, a "classic compromise."

What the compromise produced was evenhanded treatment of the duelists. The politicians who got things rolling that morning, for example, were balanced to the point of intellectual paralysis. First up was Mayor Turner. Years ago, when the Burr association wanted to place a bust of Burr in the same park, Turner had fought the project tooth and nail. He'd won, and the bust had ended up in a bank in Newark. But he didn't mention this in his speech. If anything, Turner sounded as if he had reconciled with the Burrites.

Both duelists were "early patriots," Turner told the crowd. Both were "individuals who gave so much collectively to our country." The circumstances surrounding the duel didn't matter. Nor did the duel's consequences.

Photos by Corbis

Because “the past is the past.” And “everyone is moving forward.” Turner sat down.

McGreevey spoke next. “On this ‘field of honor,’” he said, “two of the most accomplished men of their era, two political rivals who once briefly shared an alliance, engaged in a contest that would unite them in our nation’s consciousness.

“To define Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr only by what occurred here 200 years ago would represent an oversight and an oversimplification,” he continued. “The career achievements of these two men certainly exceed the extraordinary nature of this one incident.”

McGreevey droned on, and the longer he talked, the more he sounded like a partisan of Burr, who was born in Newark, New Jersey.

“If history has undervalued Hamilton, it has, at the same time, demonized Aaron Burr,” he said. “Historian Mark Hatfield wrote of our third vice president, ‘Urbane and charming, generous beyond prudence, proud, shrewd, and ambitious, he stood apart from other public figures of his day.’ A masterful politician, he drew praise from his contemporaries for his tenacity and evenhandedness, particularly in his role as president of the Senate.”

The crowd was silent.

“Regardless of the reputation earned in his day and awarded by posterity,” the governor said, “Burr occupies a position in the gallery of noteworthy figures alongside such luminaries as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison.”

McGreevey finished, and, as the presentations ended and the costumed actors took the stage, the Burrites glowed. This was their moment. The governor had elevated their man to the rank of Jefferson. The reenactment narrators drew further parallels between the

duelists: They were of “similar height and age,” both “became lawyers,” both “were avid readers,” both “enjoyed the finer things in life—good food, good wine, sumptuous surroundings.” And both were “ladies’ men.”

But something was wrong. The scope of Hamilton’s achievement was missing. It was nowhere acknowledged at the reenactment in Weehawken. Just as Burr’s importance was inflated, so Hamilton’s was shrunk. All the drama

of the great man’s end was drained away as the narrators read page after page from the letters Hamilton and Burr exchanged before the duel. At the behest of the Aaron Burr Association, the narrators painstakingly spelled out how it was that Hamilton could be deemed just as culpable as Burr. Then came a recitation of particulars relating to the pistols, the seconds, the weather on the day of the faceoff. It was nothing if not thorough.

It was also boring. But for the Burr association it was a glorious culmination. Throughout his 41 years as president, the group’s founder, Dr. Samuel Engle Burr Jr., a professor of education at American University, had scoured books and magazines and radio shows and television shows and comic strips for inaccurate portrayals of

his ancestor. And every time he had caught an artist or writer or educator portraying Aaron Burr in an unfavorable light, he had sent a note. By 1955, when the association was nine years old, Dr. Burr estimated he had written 15,000 letters—about 1,667 letters a year. Dr. Burr lived until 1987.

Year after year, letter after letter, he and the other members of his association nourished their grievance. “What we have in common,” Dr. Burr said of the association late in his life, “is resentment over the assumption, which you even find in textbooks, that Aaron Burr





Mario Tama / Getty

Antonio Burr is rowed to the reenactment, July 11, 2004

was a scoundrel and murderer and traitor.” This was nonsense, he said. And worse. It was “lies.”

Yet if you strip away the lies, if you absolve Aaron Burr of Hamilton’s death, expunge his reputation as a scoundrel, and ignore his trial for treason, what are you left with? At best, a politician who was an early advocate of abolition and women’s rights. But Burr never staked his career on those ideals or any others. To Burr, “politics was a game and a ‘great deal of fun’—it invigorated him,” said one reenactment narrator. “He was the first politician to be seen actively pursuing political office and the first to develop a ‘political machine.’”

Burr anticipated our age not in his vision, but in his constant striving for political gain. “In the 18th century,” the narrator went on, “it was not considered gentlemanly to look as though as you were trying to win votes.” But Burr was different. Burr was an “anomaly.” He was one of the first triangulators. A Democrat, “at times he rallied behind what were considered Federalist issues.” Such promiscuity

was not only political, of course. “Actually,” confided Antonio Burr, “he was a lot like Bill Clinton.”

In an era when history was being made in the play of political ideas, Burr was the other sort of politician. “Burr hardly ever committed his political philosophies or positions to paper,” said the narrator. That was probably because he was more interested in power and success, celebrity and fortune. One imagines he’d feel right at home in today’s Washington.

Would Hamilton? It is hard to say. His fierce love of principle might seem out of place. Yet in other ways, we live in Hamilton’s world. He is present in our strong federal government and our strong military. He is present in our open markets, in our dominance of global affairs, in the fact that we have a single, national culture, not 50 state-based ones. “There is an elegant memorial in Washington to Jefferson,” George Will once said, “but none to Hamilton. However, if you seek Hamilton’s monument, look around. You are living in it. We honor Jefferson, but live in Hamilton’s country.”

Those words came alive for the few who stuck around Lincoln Harbor Park last July, after the stage was disassembled and most people had gone home. The diehards boarded buses that drove them up to Hamilton Park at the top of the Weehawken cliffs. There, members of the Aaron Burr Association, along with some Hamiltons and some representatives of the Weehawken Historical Commission, dedicated two plaques. One lists all the men who fought duels at the Weehawken dueling grounds. The other commemorates the most famous of those faceoffs.

The Burrs were ecstatic about the plaque, since it’s the first representation of Burr allowed on public property in Weehawken. It depicts both contenders. They look away from each other, sad expressions on their faces. Their portraits are the same size. The inscription, placed between them like a restraining wall, reads:

THE HAMILTON-BURR DUEL JULY 11, 1804

The most famous duel in American history took place on this date at the dueling grounds in Weehawken, between political rivals, General Alexander Hamilton and sitting Vice-President of the United States, Colonel Aaron Burr. Hamilton fell, mortally wounded, and died the next day in New York City. Tragically, Hamilton’s son Phillip had also met his death here in a duel in 1801.

The plaque, which gave such satisfaction to the Burrs, seemed so tiny, there in the clifftop park beneath a sky dotted with planes and helicopters, overlooking the stream of traffic churning toward the Lincoln Tunnel. Beyond, supertankers plied the river, and the great city rose across the distance. It was a scene alive with industry, energy, movement, and power—Alexander Hamilton’s abiding legacy. ♦

Defining The Dollar Down

Nobody appreciates America's currency anymore.

BY IRWIN M. STELZER

While the world's finance ministers and assorted politicians fret about the falling dollar, and markets chew over Alan Greenspan's warning that continued inattention to our trade deficit might have deeply unpleasant consequences, most Americans find the issue a true yawner, and certainly not one to dim the general cheer of the holiday season. After all, the economy is growing at a 4 percent annual rate and has created over 2 million jobs this year (hiring of college graduates is up 20 percent over last year and their pay offers are higher by between 4 percent and 7 percent, according to the Collegiate Employment Research Institute); stock and house prices are moving ahead; farmers' incomes are up about 25 percent; and consumer confidence is at levels high enough to promise a merry Christmas for America's merchants. Pessimists are expecting holiday sales to top last year's by 3 percent; optimists put the number closer to 5 percent.

It is, of course, true that Americans with non-refundable tickets to Europe's vacation spots are in for a shock at just how little their dollars buy, but this is not high season for international tourists, so few are affected. Even fewer have sympathy for the London-based American investment bankers who are finding their dollar-denominated salaries don't go quite so far in Britain's fine restaurants and shops. As economist John Makin put it in his latest advisory, "The dollar's recently accelerating move downward has evoked more concern abroad in Europe and Asia than it has inside the United States where a beatific calm has prevailed." That doesn't mean, however, that the dollar's descent doesn't matter. It does. Or, to be precise, it might.

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When all is said and done, the dollar will remain weak until Americans stop buying billions more from overseas than we sell to foreigners. That will happen when Americans save more, Europe reforms its economies so that they are capable of import-inducing growth, and Asian countries allow their currencies to appreciate against the dollar—another way of saying, when these Asian countries stop subsidizing their exports to America.

Meanwhile, the prospects for an improvement in America's trade position seem dim. Consider the five "A"s that paradoxically combine to mean failure: autos, agriculture, aircraft, apparel, and audio-visual products. All have been the backbone of U.S. exports; all are in trouble.

Start with autos. We are importing almost \$130 billion more in cars, trucks, and parts than we are selling abroad. That makes the deficit in the auto trade almost as large as the deficit in the oil trade. The cheaper dollar should improve the competitive position of American automakers, enabling them to snare market share from Japanese and other manufacturers, who will have to raise prices here as they need more and more dollars with which to buy yen to pay their workers in Japan. But Detroit, which has accustomed consumers to huge discounts and interest-free financing in order to keep factories operating (union contracts require paying auto workers whether or not they are on the assembly lines), is desperate for profits, and will probably match the foreigners' price increases. Consumers will pay more for both made-in-the-USA cars and imports, leaving the auto trade deficit about where it is now.

Things in Des Moines are not much better than those in Detroit. Since the 1950s the value of America's agricultural exports has exceeded the value of its imports. Those days are over. Lower prices for grains and cotton are pushing down the value of U.S. exports, while imports of wine, beer, snack foods, fresh vegetables, and other high-value products continue to increase. In 1996 America ran a record agricultural trade surplus of over \$27 billion; this summer, imports exceeded exports.

The situation is no cheerier when it comes to aircraft. Boeing's long dominance of the market for planes is over. Airbus took firm orders for more jets than Boeing last year (217 vs. 197) and will repeat that victory this year. Boeing, which still holds an edge in revenue booked (\$19.8 billion vs. \$17.5 billion), has complained to the World Trade Organization that Airbus received \$15 billion in unlawful subsidies from European governments over the past 30 years. That hasn't stopped Airbus from asking Europe's governments for loans to fund development of its proposed A350 aircraft, which is aimed at the same market as Boeing's planned 7E7, a 200-300 passenger long-distance jet. The E.U.'s new trade supremo, Peter Mandelson, says he prefers negotiation to litigation, but he has not yet built up any credibility as a negotiating partner. Mandelson, whose understanding of economics is, er, minimal, has a reputation for leaking private negotiations and for possessing so many hidden political and personal agendas, including helping Tony Blair win next year's referendum on the E.U. constitution, that Boeing might reasonably prefer the WTO's straightforward forum to talks with Mandelson. Certainly, U.S. Trade Representative Bob Zoellick, who had a sound working relationship with Pascal Lamy, Mandelson's predecessor, will be well advised to sup with a long spoon when he dines with a man better known for divisiveness and political intrigue than conciliation.

Next on the "A" list is apparel. On January 1 the Multifibre Agreement—WTO rules governing the \$400 billion per year textile trade—expires. Quotas that limited how many pairs of jeans and how much fabric each country is allowed to export will be gone, leaving low-cost China and India free to take business from competitors in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the United States. American consumers, who snap up \$90 billion of textile imports every year, will benefit from cheaper goods. But the jobs of some 695,000 American workers will be threatened, making it likely that the Bush administration will take what one Commerce Department official calls "safeguard actions." American manufacturers are calling for the maintenance of 15 of the 91 quotas, including those on trousers, underwear, shirts, and sheets (bras and dressing gowns are already subject to import-limiting "safeguards"). Before yelling "protectionism," keep in mind that one reason the made-in-Asia goods are so competitive in American markets is that the Chinese regime artificially keeps its currency undervalued by pegging it to the dollar, that South Korea's monetary authorities have bought \$4 billion in foreign currencies to keep the won from rising even more than it has (10 percent since early October), and that the Bank of Japan, after abstaining from intervention since March despite an 8 percent

rise of the yen against the dollar in the same period, appears poised to reenter the markets in concert with the E.U. to prevent the yen from rising further. An Adam Smith-style free market, currency markets just ain't, and that distorts the trade in goods and services.

Finally, we have audio-visual (AV) products, a segment of what are called "core copyright industries." This core group turns out some \$630 billion of films, television, prerecorded music, computer software, and print products every year, and accounts for about \$90 billion annually in exports (more than either autos or aircraft). The U.S. Trade Representative estimates that intellectual property theft costs the core industries \$250 billion every year; *BusinessWeek* reports that 92 percent of Chinese computers run on software that is pirated or unlicensed.

Such piracy is most obvious in the case of films. The worldwide popularity of American films and television shows makes them a major contributor to the nation's exports. European films, made by subsidized producers for their own artistic satisfaction and the pleasure of the few Americans who prefer films-plus-espresso to plain old movies, pose no competitive threat. And British-made films, although popular in America because of their lush country-house settings and fine acting, are too few to make a dent in the favorable AV trade balance. The real threat comes from piracy by Chinese and other companies who put cheap, unauthorized videos of hit movies on the streets simultaneously with their commercial release. Investment bank Smith Barney estimates that losses due to piracy are running at over \$5 billion annually—and that doesn't include illegal downloading of films on the Internet.

The problems faced by these five leading U.S. industries, four of which only recently ran surpluses (not autos), suggest that it will be some time before the nation brings down its trade deficit—now running at around 5.7 percent of GDP and rising, well above the 1986 record of 3.5 percent—and that it will take a further fall in the dollar to begin to eat into the deficit.

After all, there is no reason to believe that any of the causes of the trade deficit will be addressed in a serious way by any of the world's policymakers. President Bush might push his plans to reform both Social Security and the tax structure so as to increase savings and discourage consumption, but there is little appetite in Congress for such a radical change in tax and entitlement policy, and most of the changes proposed would result in at least a near-term increase, rather than a reduction, in the already swollen budget deficit. Those who do agree with

the president that some reforms are needed can't agree on which ones are both economically desirable and politically feasible. No consensus, no reform. This should be good news for the Europeans who are calling for a tighter U.S. fiscal policy: If they get what they say they are wishing for, they will find that deficit reduction slows the U.S. economy, reducing the demand for imports and turning Europe's persistent no-growth into a recession.

Europe could accelerate—no, initiate—economic growth, but euroland is disinclined to reform its tax and regulatory regimes, or its inflexible labor markets. Have no doubt: Europe's export-led recoveries, such as they were, have ground to a halt as the euro has soared relative to the dollar, making European goods increasingly expensive in America. And, with the yuan pegged to the sinking dollar, Chinese goods are now cheaper in Europe. Little wonder that Jean-Claude Trichet, head of the European Central Bank, calls the dollar's fall "brutal."

The Chinese could abandon the peg that has kept the dollar equal to 8.3 renminbi since 1994, and allow their currency to float, making their exports more expensive. But that would threaten the jobs of the tens of millions of urbanizing Chinese, cause the value of the over \$500 billion of dollar reserves and Treasury bonds China is holding to plummet, and threaten the stability of the country's shaky banking system—problems of which both Jin Renqing, China's finance minister, and Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the central bank, are well aware. Both have hinted that they might, someday, maybe, and by a tiny bit, allow their currency to appreciate against the dollar, with Zhou telling a Group of 20 meeting in Berlin last month that Beijing is "reviewing its old foreign-exchange control systems." But John Snow, who has been urging the Chinese to unpeg their currency from the dollar, will be back in the private sector long before the Chinese allow their currency to appreciate sufficiently—say, by 30 percent—to put a significant dent in our \$160 billion trade deficit with that country.

Since none of the policymakers here, in Europe, or in Asia are prepared to make meaningful changes in the policies that have produced the U.S. trade deficit, it looks as if the dollar will have to bear the brunt of the adjustment needed to ameliorate global imbalances. Foreign investors have already begun to shy away from investing in America, reducing the demand for dollars, and therefore their price in other currencies. In the first quarter of this year, foreign investors bought a net \$176 billion of long-term U.S. securities, and central banks loaded up on

an additional \$91 billion; in the third quarter those numbers fell to \$158 billion and \$42 billion, respectively. The old oil-industry adage, used to describe the lack of drilling during an oil glut, applies here: "People don't plant 'taters when they have a cellar full of 'taters." Foreign central banks, their vaults overflowing with dollars, are already diversifying their holdings. Bush's bosom buddy, Vladimir Putin, is threatening to lead the march out of dollar assets, selling greenbacks and buying euros. India's central bank has hinted at similar moves. China and Japan, with holdings of almost \$1 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities between them, are riding a tiger: If they allow their currencies to appreciate by, say, 10 percent as the dollar falls, the value of their dollar holdings will drop by a nontrivial \$100 billion, but if they continue to buy dollars, they will be adding to their already-ample stock of 'taters.

The markets are guessing that holders of dollar assets will allow the dollar to fall further, but only gradually. Experience suggests that should result in a gradual whittling down of the trade deficit. After all, we've been there and done that: Not so long ago it was Japan that was going to cause the de-industrialization of America. But between early 1985 and late 1990 the dollar dropped by 40 percent against major currencies, and a trade deficit that was running at 3.5 percent of GDP

became a small surplus early in 1991.

What does a cheaper dollar mean for American policymakers, businesses, and consumers? Policymakers will have to approach negotiations with China as any debtor approaches any creditor: fully aware that China can play havoc with the American economy if it is willing to suffer some pain itself. U.S. companies planning foreign acquisitions will find that they have to put up more (devalued) dollars to close deals. As for consumers—attention K-Mart (and now Sears) shoppers: If China lets its currency rise, everything from imported T-shirts to attractively priced electronic gear will cost more, as imports become more expensive, and domestic manufacturers find they have more room to raise prices without losing sales to imports. And Americans planning to imbibe some European culture this summer should start thinking instead about seeing the USA in their Chevrolts (and Toyotas and Hyundais). If the natural beauties of the Grand Canyon don't beckon, consider taking advantage of the pegged and therefore cheap renminbi, and feasting your eyes on the wonder of the Great Wall of China. ♦

Europe's export-led recoveries, such as they were, have ground to a halt as the euro has soared relative to the dollar.

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The Year in Books

By JOSEPH BOTTUM

Last night I built an igloo for my daughter out of books. A model of an igloo, you understand. We were talking about how nice it would be to have a white Christmas, and then we got talking about snow, and then we got talking about the way Eskimos live, and then, well, what with all the unread review copies piled around the dining room, one thing just naturally led to another, until my wife came in and made us pick the whole mess up.

There are 175,000 books printed a year in the United States, according to the latest publishers' reports. It's beyond comprehension. All that frozen text. If the books average, say, eight inches long by two inches thick, that's 19,444 square feet of surface you could cover with the spines alone—or,

in other words, from the books published in America this year, you could build an igloo 55 feet high and 110 feet wide, with a batch of experimentalist poetry left over to make the arch for the doorway and a few odd new volumes like *The Papers of James Madison: 10 July 1812 — 7 February 1813* (Virginia, 718 pp., \$75) to use for doorstops and bootscrapers.

Of course, not all of these are real books—*book* books, as we might say. Some of this year's publications are cookbooks. Others are by Kitty Kelley. A good number are manuals, like Todd Triplett's *The Complete Guide to Small Game Taxidermy: How to Work with Squirrels, Varmints, and Predators* (Lyons, 176 pp., \$24.95)—the sort of thing you're glad to know exists for those who need it, but not something you'd typically choose as a book for yourself. Kind of like Bill Clinton's *My Life* (Knopf, 1,008 pp., \$35) or the

Hugh Hefner memoir, *Hef's Little Black Book* (HarperEntertainment, 192 pp., \$19.95).

Still, even with all the non-book books set aside, 2004 saw an endless blizzard of publication. Want a children's book? Appearing in 1904, *The Bobbsey Twins* began a series of seventy-two volumes from Edward Stratemeyer's writing factory (the innumerable Nancy Drew, Hardy Boys, and Tom Swift stories were other pseudonymous Stratemeyer productions). I always found the twins' adventures unreadable, but my mother and grandmother liked them, and they'll be glad to see such entries as *The Bobbsey Twins and the Mystery at Snow Lodge* (Grosset & Dunlap, 179 pp., \$5.99) come back into print this year. More ambitious parents might prefer the new *Polar Bear Math: Learning About Fractions from Klondike and Snow* (Henry Holt, 32 pp., \$16.95).

Joseph Bottum is Books & Arts editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

Or if your taste runs to coffee-table books, you could try *Frozen Oceans: The Floating World of Pack Ice* (Firefly, 224 pp., \$45) or the genuinely beautiful *Under Antarctic Ice: The Photographs of Norbert Wu* (California, 176 pp., \$39.95). If bodice-ripping romance warms you up, there's Alexandra Sellers's *The Ice Maiden's Sheikh* (Silhouette, 192 pp., \$4.50). If you have a sweet tooth, you might nibble on *Ice Cream Treats: Easy Ways to Transform Your Favorite Ice Cream Into Spectacular Desserts* (Chronicle, 96 pp., \$16.95).

If instead you want to shiver at the doom that global warming threatens, seize Gretel Ehrlich's overwrought *The Future of Ice: A Journey Into Cold* (Pantheon, 224 pp., \$21.95). If you need silly science-fiction fantasy about sex-starved heroines, grab Norma McPhee's *Walls of Ice* (Ltdbooks, 298 pp., \$22.99)—in which “Jannia’s plan to seek sexual healing in the arms of Emarr Dengas, the sensual green-skinned empath and former slave who once saved her life, is complicated almost from the beginning.”

Meanwhile, for the snowbound, there's the afternoon-filling *Snow Day Crosswords* (Random House, 112 pp., \$6.95) and the possibly informative *Snow Loads: A Guide to the Use and Understanding of the Snow Load Provisions of ASCE 7-02* (American Society of Civil Engineers, 128 pp., \$49) and . . . oh, never mind. *Amazon.com* lists around 500 books published in 2004 with the words “ice” or “snow” in the title, and by my calculation, only two of them deserve much attention: *Snow* (Knopf, 448 pp., \$26), Orhan Pamuk's compelling novel about a poet's visit to a modern Turkish town, and the interestingly named *One Day the Ice Will Reveal All Its Dead* (Viking, 416 pp., \$25.95), Clare Dudman's fictionalized account of Alfred Wegener, the 1920s German meteorologist who formulated the theory of continental drift.

Two books out of five hundred: That sounds about right. In fact, I'll posit it as a rule: “THE WEEKLY STANDARD's 0.4 Percent Reading Rule”—out of any random selection of

new books, less than one-half of one percent genuinely need reading.

Or, more to the point, of the 175,000 books published in America last year, THE WEEKLY STANDARD's 0.4 Percent Reading Rule predicts that 700 will repay typical readers. The other 174,300 are probably best saved for igloo-building.



Unfortunately, I didn't actually see all of those 175,000 books, so identifying the good 700 is a problem. There's a story told from time to time about reading. I'm not sure of the name of the original character involved; it's one of those bits of bastard wit that get fathered on whoever has a reputation for comedy, the way half the funny lines ever composed are magically ascribed to Mark Twain, Yogi Berra, or Winston Churchill.


But in this story, a public figure—oh, all right, it's Pat Moynihan, maybe—is standing around at a cocktail party, filling in fellow guests on the details of the latest book everyone seems to be reading. And he stumbles over some plot turn, leading one skeptical listener to ask if he's actually read the book. “Not personally,” he replies.

The joke here is in the truth. For people who follow books, there's an inexorable chain. Whenever a major new volume appears, it begins with the prepublication journals *Publishers Weekly* and *Kirkus Reviews*. Michiko Kakutani follows with a snippy notice in the *New York Times*, and book editor Erich Eichman sweet-talks someone into writing 800 words for the *Wall Street Journal*.

Then the bloggers start linking to reviews in other newspapers—the *Guardian* and the *Telegraph* from England, the great book sections that Frank Wilson runs for the *Philadelphia Inquirer* and Carol Herman puts together for the *Washington Times*. The *Times Literary Supplement*, the *New*

York Review of Books, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, the *New Republic*, and *Books & Culture* all come along with longer essays, and by the time you've worked your way through seven or eight of these reviews, you really have read the book. Just not personally.

Ron Chernow's extensively praised biography *Alexander Hamilton* (Penguin, 600 pp., \$35) and James Suro-wiecki's widely reviewed *The Wisdom of Crowds* (Doubleday, 320 pp., \$24.95) are books I greatly enjoyed reading this year—but not personally, I regret to say. Art Spiegelman's vile cartoon-attack on the United States, *In the Shadow of No Towers* (Pantheon, 42 pp., \$19.95), is something I'm grateful to have been warned off by the dozen or so notices I saw. Richard Clarke's *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (Free Press, 320 pp., \$27) and Bob Woodward's *Plan of Attack* (Simon & Schuster, 480 pp., \$28) had more reviewers than actual readers, and why not? A thousand-word summary will give you the highlights, and the lowlights you can live without.



o what were the books published in 2004 that you actually would want to keep around the igloo? The best places to start are Charles M.

Schulz's *Complete Peanuts 1950-1954* (Fantagraphics, 720 pp., \$49.95), Richard Wilbur's *Collected Poems 1943-2004* (Harcourt, 608 pp., \$35), and, of course, the critical Latin text of *P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoses* (Oxford, 534 pp., \$39.95). After those volumes, there's something of a drop-off.

Actually, that's unfair. Ovid had a good year in 2004. Not only did we finally see the critical edition of the poet's *Metamorphoses*—only seventy-five years after the original publication announcement—but Oxford also released a first-rate study guide, Elaine Fantham's *Ovid's Metamorphoses*

(Oxford, 178 pp., \$35). David Raeburn did an excellent translation, *Metamorphoses* (Penguin, 723 pp., \$11), to match last fall's equally good *Metamorphoses: A New Translation* (W.W. Norton, 608 pp., \$35) by Charles Martin. The classicist Christopher McDonough tells me Thomas McGinn's *The Economy of Prostitution in the Roman World: A Study of Social History and the Brothel* (Michigan, 392 pp., \$65) is also worth a look, but at that price for that subject, I'm forced to leave it in the not-personally category.

Meanwhile, William Shakespeare had another good year. Perhaps five hundred books with his name in the title were published in 2004, of which—beating THE WEEKLY STANDARD's 0.4 Percent Reading Rule—three are especially good for general readers. Stephen Greenblatt wandered down some strange roads in his interesting but eccentric 2001 volume *Hamlet in Purgatory*. But he returned to the main highway this year with his strong biographical study *Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare* (W.W. Norton, 386 pp., \$26.95). Harvard's Marjorie Garber gathered up her popular undergraduate lectures to create *Shakespeare After All* (Pantheon, 1,008 pp., \$40), while Frank Kermode produced a smooth and sensible history, *The Age of Shakespeare* (Modern Library, 240 pp., \$21.95).

Generally, however, we're somewhere in the middle of the seven lean years for literary criticism. The most talked-about recent volume was Terry Eagleton's *After Theory* (Basic, 256 pp., \$25), a book notable mostly for how late it is in announcing the death of overarching postmodern theory. That stuff ain't just dead. Its corpse has been frozen in the ice for a decade. René Girard's Shakespearean studies, *A Theater of Envy* (St. Augustine's, 376 pp., \$26), returned to print in 2004—just as a reminder of what groundbreaking criticism used to look like.

For superior popular criticism, try *A Terry Teachout Reader* (Yale, 448 pp., \$38). I was less taken with the productive Teachout's second book this year, *All in the Dances: A Brief Life of George Balanchine* (Harcourt,

208 pp., \$22), but that may be because modern ballet ranks somewhere around tea-cup painting and morris dancing in my list of favorite arts. Roger Kimball is always worth a read, and his *The Rape of the Masters* (Encounter, 200 pp., \$25.95) is a disturbing set of case studies in the decline of sense about art.

Bob Dylan *should* have had a good year. His new *Lyrics: 1962-2001* (Simon & Schuster, 560 pp., \$45) is worth a shot, but both the high-profile entries—the literary critic Christopher Ricks's worshipful *Dylan's Visions of Sin* (Ecco, 528 pp., \$26.95) and the sinner's own *Chronicles, Volume 1* (Simon & Schuster, 304 pp., \$24)—were misfires.

The sadly neglected novelist James T. Farrell did better: He got a solid new biography, Robert K. Landers's *An Honest Writer* (Encounter, 520 pp., \$28.95), and a handsome revival with the republication of *Studs Lonigan: A Trilogy* (Library of America, 988 pp., \$35). Henry James made the strange move from author to character during 2004 as the subject of two highly touted and serious novels: *The Master* (Scribner, 352 pp., \$25) by Colm Toibin and *Author, Author* (Viking, 389 pp., \$24.95) by David Lodge. I read them both and still don't know what I think of the attempt to out-James James.



here were a few interesting books this year that combined reporting with hard-nosed thought about public policy and culture. It's no surprise that Mary Eber-

stadt's *Home-Along America: The Hidden Toll of Day Care, Behavioral Drugs, and Other Parent Substitutes* (Sentinel, 218 pp., \$25.95) is as good as it gets, but Steven E. Rhoads's *Taking Sex Differences Seriously* (Encounter, 362 pp., \$27.95) was an unexpected success.

Phillip Longman's *The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity and What to Do About It* (Basic, 288 pp., \$26) is an important book, if only because it shows liberal analysis led, almost against its will, toward deeply conservative conclusions. I thought Susan Linn's *Consuming Kids* (New Press, 256 pp., \$24.95) was the most disturbing book of the year—a fact-filled study of just how commercialized childhood has become. David Lebedoff's *The Uncivil War: How a New Elite is Destroying Our Democracy* (Taylor, 208 pp., \$24.95) took aim at the “rule by experts” that the test-score meritocracy seems to have wished upon us.

But 2004 saw, in general, a thin trickle of such books. Last year, we had a steady stream of policy volumes worth arguing about, from Matthew Miller's *The Two Percent Solution* to Sol Stern's *Breaking Free: Public School Lessons and the Imperative of School Choice*. This year we had politics, instead.

Authors who couldn't stand John Kerry certainly had their turn, from *Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry* (Regnery, 256 pp., \$27.95) to *How to Talk to a Liberal (If You Must): The World According to Ann Coulter* (Crown Forum, 368 pp., \$26.95), featuring a picture of the leather-clad author on its cover.

But most of the partisan political books seemed to be by the president's haters. From David Corn's *The Lies of George W. Bush* (Crown, 320 pp., \$24) to Eric Alterman's *The Book on Bush* (Viking, 256 pp., \$24.95) and Maureen Dowd's *Bushworld* (Putnam, 523 pp., \$25.95), they piled around my desk like drifts of angry snow.

Some of these authors were smart-enough people once upon a time: not geniuses, you understand, but interesting to read. And then the election undid them—unhinged them, made them into raving lunatics. In *Obviously On He Sails* (Random House, 128 pp., \$12.95), Calvin Trillin set out to be the modern Ogden Nash and managed only to become the modern

Molly Ivins. In *The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson* (Scribner, 256 pp., \$24), John B. Judis turned himself from a partisan but intelligent writer into a genuine crank.

Well, maybe he had already done that in the book he and Ruy Teixeira cowrote last year, *The Emerging Democratic Majority*. The election this November didn't quite work out the way they predicted. The classic that Judis and Teixeira were imitating was Kevin Phillips's *The Emerging Republican Majority*—a 1970 volume that made its author seem the greatest of American political observers. But Phillips himself touched bottom at the beginning of 2004 with the disturbingly paranoid *American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush* (Viking, 320 pp., \$25.95).

Meanwhile, Douglas Brinkley converted himself from a pretty good popular historian to a hack hagiographer with *Tour of Duty: John Kerry and the Vietnam War* (William Morrow, 560 pp., \$25.95). Did you ever read Arundhati Roy's beautifully written 1998 novel *The God of Small Things*? Good. Don't read her 2004 entry, *An Ordinary Person's Guide to Empire* (South End, 200 pp., \$12). If an author can write for the ages, why does she bother with the minutes?



he election year did help a few books, giving them urgency and heft. Myrna Blyth's surprisingly fun account of the radicalized and gossipy politics of women's journalism, *Spin Sisters* (St. Martin's 352 pp., \$24.95), is a good example. Michael Barone's *Hard America, Soft America* (Crown Forum, 192 pp., \$22) is another, as is Thomas Frank's lefty *What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives*

Won the Heart of America (Metropolitan, 320 pp., \$24).

But most of these books might as well have come stamped with an expiration date of November 2—"Do Not Sell After Election Day." Russell Wattenberg, the founder of a free book exchange in Baltimore, was recently asked by the *Washington Post* what book he sees most often, and he immediately mentioned Lee Iacocca's 1985 autobiography *Iacocca*. That's the kind of book you end up needing a snowplow to clear away in used-book stores: large print runs with shelf-lives of about fifteen minutes.

You could find twenty such books riding out their moment on the best-seller lists in 2004. Someday soon, Joseph Wilson's *The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies that Led to War and Betrayed My Wife's CIA Identity* (Carroll & Graf, 513 pp., \$26) won't even be the answer to a trivia question.

On the war against terror, George Friedman did well with *America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies* (Doubleday, 368 pp., \$25.95), and Yossef Bodansky produced *The Secret History of the Iraq War* (ReganBooks, 570 pp., \$27.95), a confusing, badly written book that somehow manages to be filled with fascinating material anyway.

But along the way, some potentially interesting texts were badly warped. The great military historian John Keegan's *The Iraq War* (Knopf, 272 pp., \$24.95) managed to avoid most of the curse of political topicality, but this year's paperback reprint of his 2003 *Intelligence in War* (Vintage, 432 pp., \$15) was somehow retargeted to bear upon the presidential election.

The year saw a storm of small books doing Big Think about September 11, America, and the world, but even in the most interesting of them—like John Lewis Gaddis's *Surprise, Secrecy, and the American Experience* (Harvard, 160 pp., \$18.95) and Walter Russell Mead's *Power, Terror, Peace, and War* (Knopf, 240 pp., \$19.95)—the reader can sense some attempt to have a political tinge, some desire to influence the candidates' campaigns.

I'd blame the authors—that's always fun—for this desperate attempt to make their books timely. (One afternoon, when you find yourself snowed in, read the introduction Mary McCarthy talked Hannah Arendt into putting in Arendt's 1958 *The Human Condition*: an attempt to suggest that readers will appreciate the essay on universal political philosophy because it explains that puzzling recent event, the launching of Sputnik.)



ut the harvest of politicized books in the late summer and early fall this year, followed by the dearth in November, suggests it was instead the publishers

who insisted on hurrying books out before the election. Samuel P. Huntington's *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (Simon & Schuster, 448 pp., \$27) shows all the signs of a rush job, in addition to its other peculiarities. Mario Cuomo might have written an interesting book on Abraham Lincoln—this isn't an impossibility; somewhere out on the far, flat edges of the probability curve, there's a thin chance that Cuomo writes an interesting book—but *Why Lincoln Matters: Today More Than Ever* (Harcourt, 192 pp., \$24) is instead a quickie hack job, churned out to try to influence the election.

I know that November 2 was only last month, but it feels as though five years have gone by—five book years, that is, on the analogy of dog years.

George W. Bush is still president, but John Dean's *Worse Than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush* (Little, Brown, 272 pp., \$22.95) already has the musty scent of a Bull Moose attack on the tariff policies of William Howard Taft. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge's *The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America* (Penguin, 400 pp., \$25.95) and James Mann's *Rise of*

the *Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (Viking, 400 pp., \$25.95) were good reads. But they have both gotten a little brown around the edges in the few months since they were published.


And as for the torrent of books on the vast neoconservative conspiracy—even I couldn't keep up with them, and I actually *know* most of those diabolical neocons. *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge, 382 pp., \$28), and *Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neoconservatives Are Putting the World at Risk* (Prometheus, 268 pp., \$26), and *Where the Right Went Wrong: How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency* (Thomas Dunne, 272 pp., \$24.95), and *Take Back the Right: How the Neocons and the Religious Right Have Hijacked the Conservative Movement* (Carroll & Graf, 298 pp., \$14)—their titles are almost indistinguishable, and I can't tell the far-left attacks from the far-right anymore. Besides, it all seems a dozen or more book years ago.

Of course, “book years” used to mean something different—elephant years, maybe, instead of dog years. I love the way old essays in a journal like, say, the *New Scholasticism* would mention “recent” books.

“Against Burckhardt's somewhat unscholarly presentation,” a typical paragraph would begin, “we must set Ernst Cassirer's more recent *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*”—by which the author meant work published in German in 1927, responding to a book that first appeared in 1860.

Well, why not? In a world in which the eighteenth-century Immanuel Kant is a modern writer, the thirteenth-century Duns Scotus one of the dangerously trendy breed of scholastics, and the fifth-century Proclus a relatively fresh commentator on platonism—in books seen under the aspect of eternity, in other words—Cassirer's 1927 rehabilitation of Renaissance philosophy happened just yesterday. The Renaissance itself was only a few years ago.

A few book years, that is. *Books are long, and time is fleeting*, as our great contemporary Henry Wadsworth Longfellow didn't quite say. There are already copies of John Sperling's new *The Great Divide: Retro vs. Metro America* (PoliPoint, 296 pp., \$39.95) gathering dust on used-book tables. Pick one up, and you'll see what I mean.



somebody said, reaching for the wine, “and he's written some serious books himself. But is he a *book* guy?”

I knew what was meant. The book guy—the book gal, for that matter—seems to be disappearing species these days, despite the 175,000 books published a year. Or maybe I mean *because* of the 175,000 books published a year.

You used to find them running little neighborhood bookstores, with all the skillful salesmanship of frightened possums. They scrounged around as occasional reviewers for dying evening newspapers, and they sneered at best-seller lists as a record of what the amateurs were reading.


The book guys could tell you what Joseph Brodsky's latest collection of poetry was like—and why Robert Heinlein's *Starship Troopers* was better schlock science fiction than Joe Halderman's *The Forever War*. They could name the standard biographies of Martin Luther—and explain why Max Brand's westerns should be brought back into print. They always seemed to find jobs that let them work at night, and they didn't bathe enough, but, man, did they know books.

Who now can keep up with it all? Most book-review editors I know gave up several years ago—and they get free copies of anything they want. (The

couple of friends and I were sitting around late one night, and I mentioned the new book-review editor of a newspaper up in New York. “Sure he's smart,”

poet Laurance Wieder once suggested we'd see a damn-sight fewer of those reviews that end “an interesting and worthy volume” if reviewers had to pay for the book themselves.)

I know that I, at least, can't make sense of the publishing world anymore. Most days I just sit by the window and watch the blizzard of new books swirl around outside. Occasionally, when something drifts against the window sill for a moment and catches my eye, I pick up the phone and call a reviewer. The rest of the time I watch the woods fill up with snow.



till, I know a few of the dying tribe of book people, and I called them to ask what they had liked this year.

They all agreed that the one place you could mostly

escape the pressure of politics was—no surprise—in escapist fantasy and science fiction. Neal Stephenson wrote 2,700 pages with a fountain pen in 18 months, and I thought the result showed a lot of self-indulgence. The *Baroque Trilogy* should have been three 300-page books, not three 900-page monsters. Still, the final volume has appeared, *The System of the World* (William Morrow, 892 pp., \$27.95), and it seems inescapable.


Terry Pratchett delivered the latest of his annual Discworld novels, *Going Postal* (HarperCollins, 384 pp., \$24.95), and nobody does his kind of comedy better. Jasper Fforde had the fourth of his Thursday Next books, *Something Rotten* (Viking, 320 pp., \$24.95), and though the writing seems to have gotten sloppier, the series remains the cleverest and bookiest thing around.

Fantasy has been improving in recent years. There is still a large amount of pseudo-Tolkien being published, but Robin Hobb shows how modern fantasy ought to run, with *Fool's Fate* (Spectra, 640 pp., \$24.95),

the third book in her Tawny Man trilogy (the ninth and concluding volume of her Fitzchivalry Farseer saga).

I know several readers who find George R.R. Martin frustrating—why exactly do we have to work our way through yet another 700-page volume before we find out what happened to characters in the first volume?—but his *A Song of Ice and Fire* series is a significant attempt to do something new and complicated with narrative in fantasy, and the fourth volume *A Feast for Crows* (Spectra, 704 pp., \$28) appeared this year.

Meanwhile, the grand old man of high, even theological, science fiction is Gene Wolfe, and he produced two volumes of his *Wizard Knight* series in 2004: *The Knight* (Tor, 432 pp., \$25.95) and *The Wizard* (Tor, 480 pp., \$25.95).



In mysteries and thrillers, there were a few hints this year that the serial-killer subgenre may actually come to end within our lifetime. (And some people think

that God doesn't exist.) Donald Westlake continued his comedies—long-time favorites of THE WEEKLY STANDARD—with two Dortmunder entries: *The Road to Ruin* (Mysterious, 352 pp., \$25) and a collection of stories, *Thieves' Dozen* (Mysterious, 208 pp., \$12.95). He may be signaling the end of the hard-boiled tales he writes under the name "Richard Stark" with *Nobody Runs Forever* (Mysterious, 304 pp., \$23.95). Catch him while you can.

Meanwhile, I liked the latest of Rebecca Pawel's Spanish Civil War mysteries *Law of Return* (Soho, 288 pp., \$24), and the Swedish writer Torgny Lindgren's *Hash* (Overlook, 236 pp., \$23.95) was widely praised. Traditional British country-house murders saw James Anderson's light-hearted *The Affair of the 39 Cufflinks* (Poisoned Pen, 330 pp., \$24.95), and

the best of the raging stream of historical mysteries may have been Steven Saylor's *Judgment of Caesar: A Novel of Ancient Rome* (St. Martin's Minotaur, 304 pp., \$24.95).

The very eccentric Jewish writer Joseph Telushkin cowrote with Allen Estrin the very eccentric *Heaven's Witness* (Toby, 462 pp., \$19.95), easily the most interesting of this year's religious mysteries. In detective stories, THE WEEKLY STANDARD's regular mystery reviewer, Jon L. Breen, reports that Michael Koryta's *Tonight I Said Goodbye* (St. Martin's Minotaur, 304 pp., \$21.95) and Stuart Kaminisky's *The Last Dark Place* (Forge, 256 pp., \$23.95) are worth a look.

So is Mat Coward's *Over and Under* (Five Star, 247 pp., \$25.95). With *Old Boys* (Overlook, 476 pp., \$25.95), Charles McCarry capped his long career of political thrillers.

I read only a little new horror fiction this year. Stephen King finally finished off his series with the seventh volume, *The Dark Tower* (Donald M. Grant / Scribner, 864 pp., \$35). Peter Straub's *In the Night Room* (Random House, 330 pp., \$21.95) was a good read, while Phil Rickman proved he's a keeper with his occult mystery *The Prayer of the Night Shepherd* (Pan, 356 pp., \$24.95).

But the horror book of the year, by a wide margin, was Russell Kirk's *Ancestral Shadows: An Anthology of Ghostly Tales* (Wm. B. Eerdmans, 406 pp., \$25). Gathered together, the stories demonstrate that Kirk was a master of the classic ghost story, a now dying form.



more deliberately high-brow fiction, this was the year that the mass-market genres made a bid for respectability. With *Jonathan Strange & Mr. Norrell* (Bloomsbury, 800 pp., \$27.95), Susanna Clarke tried to bring magic and his-

torical fantasy into serious fiction—and successfully, though the book seems around a hundred pages too long.

So, too, in *The Plot Against America* (Houghton Mifflin, 400 pp., \$26), Philip Roth took one of the pulpiest of forms—alternate history—and tried to make a real novel out of it. The initial reviews made me suspicious, suggesting the book claims the United States was always on the edge of Nazism and the Jews missed an American Holocaust only by the slimmest of chances. But the first, politicized reviewers were wrong, I think: Roth seems to be arguing in part that America is, in fact, endlessly resilient, and even if some native fascism had managed to seize control, we would soon have shaken it off.



mong the giants, V.S. Naipaul has just published *Magic Seeds* (Knopf, 288 pp., \$25), and Muriel Spark's corpus expanded to include *The Finishing School*


(Doubleday, 181 pp., \$16.95) and *All the Poems of Muriel Spark* (New Directions, 144 pp., \$13.95). William Trevor collected his later stories in *A Bit on the Side* (Viking, 244 pp., \$24.95)—and you might pick up Hugh Ormsby-Lennon's new study of Trevor, *Fools of Fiction* (Maunsel, 364 pp., \$74.95) to go along with it.

Meanwhile, with *The Final Solution* (Fourth Estate, 131 pp., \$16.95), Michael Chabon produced his first major book since his 2000 *Amazing Adventures of Kavalier and Clay*, and David Mitchell's *Cloud Atlas* (Random House, 528 pp., \$14.95) was a genuinely fine novel.

The year also saw a few good literary biographies, particularly *Borges* (Viking, 574 pp., \$34.95) by Edwin Williamson, *E.E. Cummings* (Sourcebooks, 606 pp., \$29.95) by Christopher Sawyer-Laucanno, and *Wodehouse*

(W.W. Norton, 530 pp., \$27.95) by Robert McCrum. (Notice the fading of recent years' convention of fancy titles for biographies, with the subject's name relegated to the subtitle? A welcome change.)

In the Wodehousean mode of lighter books, comedy saw four nearly perfect contestants: *An Evening of Long Goodbyes* (Random House, 421 pp., \$24.95) by Paul Murray; *Admissions* (Warner, 368 pp., \$23.95), Nancy Lieberman's hilarious tale of trying to get your children into upscale schools; *It's All True: A Novel of Hollywood* (Simon & Schuster, 288 pp., \$23) by David Freeman; and, of course, Christopher Buckley's *Florence of Arabia* (Random House, 272 pp., \$24.95).



Friends of THE WEEKLY STANDARD had a good year. Stephen F. Hayes has worked his reporting for this magazine into the important book

The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America (HarperCollins, 224 pp., \$19.95).

Contributing editor John Podhoretz chipped in with one of the year's best political books, *Bush Country: How George W. Bush Became the First Great Leader of the 21st Century—While Driving Liberals Insane* (St. Martin's, 288 pp., \$24.95), due out shortly in paperback.

Another contributing editor, Reuel Marc Gerecht, produced a must-read, *The Islamic Paradox* (AEI, 225 pp., \$15); another, Tod Lindberg, edited *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership* (Routledge, 245 pp., \$18.95); and yet another, Irwin Stelzer, edited *Neo-conservatism* (Atlantic, 276 pp., \$36.56), a collection of essays, some old and excellent, others new and stimulating.

Meanwhile, William F. Buckley finished *Miles Gone By: A Literary Autobiography* (Regnery, 594 pp., \$29.95), Gertrude Himmelfarb gave us *The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments* (Knopf, 304 pp., \$25), Jeremy Rabkin published *The Case for Sovereignty* (AEI, 257 pp., \$25), Norman Podhoretz collected *The Norman Podhoretz Reader: A Selection of His Writings from the 1950s through the 1990s* (Free Press, 496 pp., \$35), David Brooks released *On Paradise Drive: How We Live Now (And Always Have) in the Future Tense* (Simon & Schuster, 320 pp., \$25), and Peter Berkowitz edited *Varieties of Conservatism in America* (Hoover, 166 pp., \$15), collecting essays from several WEEKLY STANDARD writers.

Books by our Internet friends include Scott Ott's hilarious *Axis of Weasels* (MacMenamin, 212 pp., \$12.95), and Hugh Hewitt's *If It's Not Close, They Can't Cheat: Crushing the Democrats in Every Election and Why Your Life Depends on It* (Nelson, 272 pp., \$19.99). Can I mention here *The Pius War* (Lexington, 282 pp., \$29.95), the collection of essays on Pius XII and the Second World War that I coedited with David Dalin? No, probably not.




Too much historical non-fiction this year was hurt by the election and the war in Iraq, but one good result was an increased interest in the general topic of Anglo-America. Eric P. Kaufmann took a gloomy view in *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America* (Harvard, 384 pp., \$49.95), while Timothy Garton Ash had a sunnier vision in *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West* (Random House, 304 pp., \$24.95).

James C. Bennett ecstatically pushed the idea with *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking*

Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century (Rowman & Littlefield, 352 pp., \$39.95). In *Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America* (Broadway, 384 pp., \$25.95), James Webb followed the lead of David Hackett Fischer's classic *Albion's Seed* in finding the perduring influence of the United States' British roots. David Hackett Fischer himself produced *Liberty and Freedom: A Visual History of America's Founding Ideas* (Oxford, 851 pp., \$50).

First-rate political studies and biographies seemed fewer in 2004 than normal. I liked Scott Stossel's *Sarge: The Life and Times of Sargent Shriver* (Smithsonian, 704 pp., \$32.50), Michael Janeway's *The Fall of the House of Roosevelt* (Columbia, 284 pp., \$27.50), and Michael Ybarra's *Washington Gone Crazy* (Steerforth, 818 pp., \$35), the story of the forgotten Pat McCarran. Christopher Browning's *The Origins of the Final Solution* (Nebraska, 640 pp., \$39.95) and Harold H. Tittmann Jr.'s *Inside the Vatican of Pius XII* (Image, 240 pp., \$13.95) both mapped out new material about the Holocaust.



missed too much this year in nonfiction, but four other books caught my eye and held it: *The Man Who Would Be King: The First American in Afghanistan*


(Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 351 pp., \$25) by Ben Macintyre, *Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?* (Knopf, 368 pp., \$26.95) by David Fromkin, *Flesh in the Age of Reason: The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul* (W.W. Norton, 660 pp., \$29.95) by the late Roy Porter, and the compellingly interesting *Heavenly Intrigue: Johannes Kepler, Tycho Brahe, and the Murder Behind One of History's Greatest Scientific Discoveries* (Doubleday, 320 pp., \$24.95) by Joshua and Anne-Lee Gilder.

In sports, there was *Namath: A Biography* (Viking, 512 pp., \$27.95) by Mark Kriegel and *The Second Mark: Courage, Corruption, and the Battle for Olympic Gold* (Simon & Schuster, 352 pp., \$25) by Joy Goodwin. In travel, there was Tobias Jones's peculiar look at the Italians, *The Dark Heart of Italy* (North Point, 336 pp., \$24).

Children's books included *The Grim Grotto* (HarperCollins, 352 pp., \$11.99), the eleventh entry in Lemony Snickett's fantastically inventive *Series of Unfortunate Events*, although I'm dreading the recently announced movie. *Your Favorite Seuss* (Random House, 368 pp., \$34.95) collects thirteen Dr. Seuss stories, including *Horton Hears a Who* and *Oh, the Places You'll Go*.

Among coffee-table books, it's hard not to mention *The Complete Cartoons of the New Yorker* (Black Dog & Leventhal, 656 pp., \$60), but I'll try. New Yorkers themselves might prefer *New York: The Photo Atlas* (HarperResource, 400 pp., \$60).

The most intriguing architectural book I looked at was *Imagining Ground Zero: The Official and Unofficial Proposals for the World Trade Center Site* (Rizzoli, 252 pp., \$60). I thought the catalogue *Byzantium: Faith and Power (1261-1557)* (Yale, 650 pp., \$75) the most beautiful book of the year.



oetry suffered this year, with the deaths of Czeslaw Milosz, Anthony Hecht, and Donald Justice. Besides Richard Wilbur's *Collected Poems 1943-2004*, I added

to my permanent shelves Milosz's *Second Space: New Poems* (Ecco, 112 pp., \$23.95), Justice's *Collected Poems* (Knopf, 304 pp., \$25), Rhina P. Espailat's *The Shadow I Dress In* (Wordtech, 144 pp., \$16), Deborah Warren's *New Criterion* prizewinning *Zero Meridian* (Ivan R. Dee, 96 pp.,

\$18.95), and Catherine Tufariello's *Keeping My Name* (Texas Tech, 79 pp., \$19.95).

David Mason's *Arrivals* (Story Line, 110 pp., \$14) and Len Krisak's *If Anything* (Wordtech, 104 pp., \$16) are both new, first-class formalist work by WEEKLY STANDARD contributors.



id I already name Graham Allison's disturbing *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (Times, 272 pp., \$24)?

Or Jeffrey Stout's earnest

Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, 368 pp., \$35)—a book worth arguing about from a lefty who has reasoned himself into the political and social necessity of religion?

Lord, there were just too many books. John Wilson of *Books & Culture* has been forcing Stephen Webb's *Divine Voice: Christian Proclamation and the Theology of Sound* (Brazos, 244 pp., \$24.99) on everybody he can find, and Duke's Stanley Hauerwas has been booming David Aers's *Sanctifying Signs: Making Christian Tradition in Late Medieval England* (Notre Dame, 296 pp., \$55). George Weigel gave us *Letters to a Young Catholic* (Basic, 208 pp., \$22.50), while Christine Rosen added *Preaching Eugenics* (Oxford, 296 pp., \$35), an account of the role of religious leaders in the rise of eugenics.

Reading Bernd Wannenwetsch's *Political Worship: Ethics for Christian Citizens* (Oxford, 402 pp., \$145), I spent most of my time squabbling with the author. Is that a sign of a book you want to recommend or not? Anyway, it's the sign of a serious book.

In *Freeing God's Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights* (Rowman & Littlefield, 368 pp., \$27.95), Allen D. Hertzke showed the reemergence of America's religious believers on the world stage. Joseph Loconte gathered surprising material

for his excellent historical study *The End of Illusions: Religious Leaders Confront Hitler's Gathering Storm* (Rowman & Littlefield, 252 pp., \$65).

And then there's Robert Alter's *The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary* (W.W. Norton, 1,064 pp., \$35.95), which is automatically the Jewish book of the year—and close to being the book of the year for everyone. I enjoyed *Outwitting History: The Amazing Adventures of a Man Who Rescued a Million Yiddish Books* (Algonquin, 328 pp., \$24.95) by Aaron Lansky, and Abraham Rabinovich's *The Yom Kippur War* (Schocken, 560 pp., \$27.50) seems a solid entry. As does Dennis Ross's *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 872 pp., \$35).



et's see. What does that still leave? How about Ken Silverstein's *The Radioactive Boy Scout: The True Story of a Boy and His Backyard Nuclear Reactor* (Ran-

dom House, 240 pp., \$22.95)? Or Corinne May Botz's *The Nutshell Studies of Unexplained Death* (Monacelli, 223 pp., \$35)? Or Robert Sullivan's *Rats: Observations on the History and Habitat of the City's Most Unwanted Inhabitants* (Bloomsbury, 256 pp., \$23.95)?

Maybe this wasn't such a cold year for books, after all. Even applying THE WEEKLY STANDARD's 0.4 Percent Reading Rule to the 175,000 new titles, we still had around 700 books for reading in 2004. More than I could get through, even after I built my daughter an igloo.

Once you've constructed your own ice palace, try taking inside with you David Laskin's account of the winter of 1888, *The Children's Blizzard* (HarperCollins, 320 pp., \$24.95). It's as good a way as any to finish off the year. ♦



"What a shame—his note in a bottle has been optioned by Hollywood."

Books in Brief



***The Reformation: A History* by Patrick Collinson (Modern Library, 238 pp., \$21.95).** In his preface to this pocket-size history,

Cambridge professor Patrick Collinson announces his audience as "the general reader who may know very little about the Reformation." As a brief survey for laymen, this book covers the essentials of its subject, including those unfamiliar to many college graduates. *The Reformation* is organized into chapters with textbook topics: Luther, Calvin, the English Reformation, the Radical Reformers, the Catholic Reformation, etc. Though this format is the standard one, Collinson effectively presents it as living history—aiming "to make issues that are remote from today's thinking and concerns as accessible as possible."

Though Collinson highlights Luther's "discovery of the Gospel," he has no unifying thesis. Nor should

we expect one. As an introductory survey, his book concentrates on the basics. Collinson emphasizes as central to the Reformation the great Christian theme of renewal. On this point he asks the crucial historiographical question: Was the Reformation "a kind of midwife to the modern world?" He is best when he considers such sweeping questions, and Collinson argues well for the Reformation as a single, definitive leap toward modernity.

Though Collinson deserves praise for this helpful survey, he makes an unfortunate misstep. The organization of his book—into progressive reformers, radicals, and Catholic reactionaries—seems anachronistic. It skews our perspective to map the divisions of the Reformation according to twentieth-century politics. "Conservative" and "liberal" hardly fit disputes about how men perceive their relationship to God and salvation. Collinson's descriptions of Calvin as Marx-like and his Geneva as a sixteenth-century Moscow do not

help us understand anything. It is not their issues we thus access, but our own.

—Daniel Sullivan



***Shaming the Devil: Essays in Truthtelling* by Alan Jacobs (Wm B. Eerdmans, 261 pp., \$20).** Alan Jacobs may be our best writer at

exposing the simplistic failure of would-be "prophetic voices." The problem, he explains in *Shaming the Devil*, is that writers' lines are often "resonant—they sound prophetic—because they are simple, but they are simple because they ignore so much of the truth." After the attacks of September 11, for example, many turned to W.H. Auden's poem "September 1, 1939"—despite the fact that Auden had thoroughly rejected it. He rejected it because he recognized the falseness of its most-loved phrases: *Those to whom evil is done / Do evil in return*, and *We must love one another or die*. Both sound good, but the truth is not so simple. In the late 1940s, Auden wrote beside the poem, "This is a lie."

In a world prophetically reduced to two axes—one good and the other evil—all artists need to be reminded that truth is more complex. In "The Witness" (which first appeared in *THE WEEKLY STANDARD*, as did an earlier version of the brilliant essay "The Republic of Heaven"), Jacobs quotes Solzhenitsyn precisely on this point: "The line separating good and evil," he writes, "passes not through states, nor between classes, not between political parties either—but right through every human heart." The glory of Jacobs's book lies in this constant reminder. *Shaming the Devil* might equally well have been titled *Against Simplicity*, with a central message gleaned from Scripture: "Beware of false prophets." In an age when prophets are eagerly sought, bought, and sold, it is a message that bears repeating.

—Abram Van Engen

The CIA is quietly funding federal research into surveillance of Internet chat rooms as part of an effort to identify possible terrorists. . . . One of those projects is . . . devoted to automated monitoring and profiling of the behavior of chat-room users.

—CNET News, November 24, 2004

Parody

EXCERPT:

(**MartyrMule** joined the room.)

MartyrMule: ru there

OneEyeImam: Salaaaaaam!!!!

(**MullahBomb** left the room.)

MartyrMule: nice 2 c u

OneEyeImam: u 2. marwan sez u mad at him.

MartyrMule: Marwan devil-pig, steal my idea for big explosion }:-{>

OneEyeImam: explosion where?

MartyrMule: anywhere. Explosion = my idea. Marwan thief.

OneEyeImam: Marwan no good.

MartyrMule: 2nite I b-hed Marwan.

(**GunsAndStubble** joined the room.)

GunsAndStubble: Asalaamuuuuu

OneEyeImam: nice 2 c u

GunsAndStubble: Waziri WiFi v bad

OneEyeImam: call cable co.

GunsAndStubble: company no good

MartyrMule: Maybe explode cable co.

GunsAndStubble: Marwan have same idea.

MartyrMule: Not Marwan idea. Explosion my idea. 2 nite Marwan pay.

GunsAndStubble: Maybe better idea 2 shoot pedestrians outside cable co.

OneEyeImam: that or explosion both good idea. ROCFL!

(**MarwanMeccaton** joined the room.)

MarwanMeccaton: Aaaaaaam!

MartyrMule: Greetings, brother Marwan. Come 2 my cave 2nite for dinner!

MarwanMeccaton: TY! no angry feelings?

MartyrMule: No angry! }:-)> I offer hand of brotherhood. Pls wear low-collared shirt.

To: DCI
From: Internet Chat Surveillance Unit

Date: 12-2-04
Re: This a.m.'s transcripts

Common Usage In Terrorist Chat Rooms

(Updated 9-18-2004)

AOEM	Ask one-eyed mullah
BO4W	Beat obstinate fourth wife
D2ZPD	Death to Zionist pig-dog
EBTH	Even better than hijacking
hug	*Hairy, unruly goat*
ROCFL	Rolling on cave floor laughing
72VIP	Seventy-two virgins in paradise
SIMO	Standard-issue martyrdom operation
TVM	Threatening videotaped monologue
TVMSH	Threatening videotaped monologue starring henchman
WTBB	Worse than bunker buster